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INTRODUCTION
How do you get along at the office? Do you trust each other? Or does

each have a separate safe for his money?
1
-Groucho Marx to several lawyers

The very concept of a team of lawyers, whether colleagues
or adversaries, evokes suspicion in the popular mind. If a group
of lions is a pride, so the joke goes, a group of lawyers is a conspiracy. Yet lawyer teams-associated trial counsel, partnerships, corporate legal teams, legal service groups-have always
been with us. These groups share not only safes but often a degree of trust and skillful team coordination that suggests the
fear underlying the popular myth is not that lawyers cannot
work together, but that they are too powerful when they do.
We have begun to pay serious attention to certain types of
lawyer teams, studying the impact of organizational structure
and bar stratification on the delivery of legal services. 2 Yet we
1.

M. GREEN, THE OTHER GovERNmENT 6-7 (1975) (quoting Groucho

Marx).
2. See, e.g., G. HAzARD, ETHIcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978);
Laumann & Heinz, The Organization of Lawyers' Work. Size, Intensity, and
Co-Practice in the Fields of Law, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 (discussing
implications of specialization and co-practice in various fields of law); Nelson,
Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms,
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continue to ignore the smallest organizational building block
in
3
the lawyer's professional repertoire-the task-sharing team.
According to organizational theory, the most important exercise of organizational power lies in designing and implementing the frameworks in which decisions are made. 4 Although the
legal profession has become increasingly conscious of the way
that it exercises power through the design of the larger decision-making constructs, such as law firms, bar associations, corporate legal departments, and government agencies, 5 it has paid
scant attention to the smaller frameworks that lawyers, often
unwittingly, fashion for day-by-day decisions-task-sharing
teams.

6

1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 97 (discussing organizational structure of large law
firms and their impact on legal system); Slovak, Giving and Getting RespectPrestige and StratWcationin a Legal Elite, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 31 (examining social impact of stratification of firm partners and house counsel).
3. See infra note 6. Most formal and informal lawyer associations are
variations built on two organizational building blocks, task sharing and partnership. The task-sharing team, as this Article defines it, works on a particular assignment for a specified client or client group. The team can be small
(two lawyers) and short-lived (a discrete job assignment). In a partnership
lawyers share resources, risks, and benefits but not necessarily work.
Although a partnership can also be composed of relatively few individuals, it
presupposes duration over time.
4. Ranson, Hinings & Royston, The Structuring of OrganizationalStructures, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 7-9 (1980).
5. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2, infra note 24.
6. See E. SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE 197 (1986) (lawyers pay little attention to organization of their work); Gilboy & Schmidt, Replacing Lawyers:
A Case Study of the Sequential Representation of CriminalDefendants, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1979) (little research on problems created by

criminal lawyers who represent clients sequentially); Mounts, Public Defender
Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 473, 530 (historically, fact that attorneys practice within large organizations has been ignored).
There are several reasons for this lack of attention. Most important, perhaps, is the premise underlying the theory of professional organizations that
professionals generally work alone in whatever structure they may occupy.
See sources cited infra note 7. While this theory concedes the significant impact of institutional and management constraints on professional work product, the technical aspects of the lawyering craft are thought to be
accomplished in relative solitude. For this reason few organizational studies
focus on the dynamics of task-sharing teams composed of workers in the same
profession. See generally COLLEAGUES IN ORGANIZATION (R. Blankenship ed.
1977) (analyzing teams working in same profession); E. FREiDsON, PROFESSION
OF MEDICImE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE (1970)
(same).
Additionally, theories regarding professionalization seem to assume that
teamwork increases individual competence and ethicality and that teamwork,
therefore, is a relatively benign phenomenon. See, e.g., Bucher & Stelling,
Characteristicsof Professional Organizations, in COLLEAGUES IN ORGANIZA-
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Until recently sociologists and legal scholars accepted the
conventional wisdom that lawyers practice in groups but not in
teams, because of the unique nature of the lawyer-client relationship and the high degree of professional judgment and autonomy required.7 Although this tenet remains substantially
true for the majority of practitioners, many lawyers practicing
in the largest and most powerful American firms now work in
task-sharing teams. 8 The 1987 Iran-Contra hearings brought
into sharper focus the legal, ethical, and moral dilemmas faced
by members of a high-pressure team. From the congressional
hearings emerged the disturbing message that we must confront the way that small groups in adversarial situations work
TION

127-29 (R. Blankenship ed. 1977). The sole empirical study of the relation-

ship between ethicality and types of lawyer teamwork generally supports this
premise. See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW
YORK CrrY BAR 58 (1966) (lawyers who face most difficult ethical decisions
work alone or in small groups).
Finally, practicing lawyers do not appear to regard the structuring of responsibility and authority in task-sharing teams as particularly problematic.
Attention to this issue appears confined to possible violations of ethical codes
or positive law. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2110(C)(3) (1980) (lawyer may withdraw when unable to work with co-counsel);
id. EC 5-12 (counsel unable to agree on matter vital to client's representation
should submit disagreement jointly to client for resolution). Even here, the
profession's scrutiny has not been intense. For example, in the last 70 years
the American Bar Association (ABA) has been consulted only once regarding
the appropriate resolution of a direct conflict of judgment arising between lawyers working together as a team. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1203 (1972) (when junior attorney and senior attorney disagree over whether some fact must be called to attention of tribunal,
junior attorney must withdraw from case); cf. ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Formal Op. 324, at 6 (1970) (Code "militate[s] against any interference
with the lawyer-client relationship by the directors of a legal aid society after
a case has been assigned to a staff attorney"); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. 1074 (1969) (military defense counsel not justified in
obeying order from superior not to investigate issue in case if he feels it necessary to client's defense; instead, junior counsel must seek withdrawal of order
or ask that it be rescinded by higher authority).
7. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 118 (1967)
("Legal work is largely the product of individual rather than group effort.");
see also Nelson, supra note 2, at 127 (departmentalization and specialization affect scope of individual practice but not production process itself); Zirkle, Dynamics of Group Behavior in the Practice of Law, 11 LAW OFF. ECON. &
MGmr. 493, 496 (1971) (most firms are federations of proprietors); infra note
17 and accompanying text (most lawyers will work alone). But see E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 66 (much of actual labor of law firm accomplished
through teamwork system).
8. See Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 TEL L.
REV. 1269, 1283-84 (1980); see also Basten, Control and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 6 J. LEG. PROF. 7, 8 (1981) (structure of profession changing as increasing number of lawyers work as employees).
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and how they can err.9 It seems worthwhile therefore to look
beyond the conventional wisdom about autonomy to find out
how such task-sharing patterns affect the way that lawyers
work.
This task grows more urgent as courts grapple with increasingly complex questions concerning the division of authority and responsibility for specific client services among lawyers.
These questions come embedded in issues of case management,
competence, collective and supervisory responsibility, tort and
malpractice liability, ethical responsibility, fee arrangements,
and conflicts of interest.' 0
This Article shows that task sharing among lawyers is not
only increasingly common but increasingly important; what
was once done with little conscious planning is becoming a common mode of operation, perhaps the standard building block in
the larger organizational constructs within which lawyers operate. Task sharing, particularly in larger groups, raises a range
of technical and ethical problems for the individual practitioner
and for the profession as a whole that we can no longer accommodate. Instead, we must analyze the process of teamwork, the
reasons behind it, its impact on the central lawyering task, and
the way that team lawyers approach problems raised by constant jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts in decision making,
information transmission, and client relations.
9.

HOUSE SELECT CoMM.

TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS

wITH IRAN & SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COM-

MTT'EEs INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP.
No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 285-324 (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA REPORT] (discussing group concealment of information in Iran-Contra affair); see

also Eight Important Days in November: Unraveling of the Iran-ContraAffair,N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, § 1, at 10, col. 1 (discussing defense counsel's and
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's implicit approval of North's secretary

smuggling documents out of White House).
10. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 217 (2d
Cir. 1987) (fee arrangements for plaintiffs' ad hoc "firm"), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 695 (1988); Hunt v. Tomlinson, 799 F.2d 712, 713-14 (11th Cir. 1986) (per

curiam) (malpractice liability when two lawyers involved in case); Lyle v.
Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 392, 399-400 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (duty
of team members to investigate facts), rev'd mem., 822 F.2d 64 (11th Cir. 1987);
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.RD. 48, 70-76 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (lawyers'

struggle for control of class action), qff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1984); J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.P.D. 338, 347-48
(D. Conn. 1981) (collective and individual responsibility for acts of others on

team); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 1973-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,363, at 93,685-86 (D. Minn. 1973) (lawyers' destruction
of documents).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:697

The first part of the Article looks at the nature of the
lawyering task itself. It identifies three forms of ambiguity that
enrich and complicate the lawyer's work-task ambiguity, role
ambiguity, and norm ambiguity-and explores the ways in
which lawyer teamwork alters these ambiguities. Part II examines the behavior of lawyers in four task-sharing litigation
teams characteristic of team types found in current private
legal practice. These case studies demonstrate the specific
problems faced by lawyers who must work together, including
the practical difficulties of dividing authority and transmitting
critical information among themselves. The studies also expose
the more subtle ethical problems that underlie teamwork, including problems of conflict avoidance and resolution, pressures
to conform to team norms, and the temptation to "lose" information injurious to team goals.
Part III examines possible regulatory responses to these
problems. It suggests that because lawyers rarely discuss the
phenomenon of teamwork with each other, and never with outsiders, they have developed little practical insight into the
workings of lawyer teams and little positive law to regulate
such teams. Part III predicts that as teamwork problems come
increasingly to the attention of the public and the judiciary,
managerial judging will provide an effective short-term check
on some of the excesses created by lawyer teamwork. The Article concludes, however, that ad hoc judicial regulation is not a
long-term solution; practicing lawyers, legal scholars, and social
scientists must focus on the unarticulated problems faced by
lawyers working together so that regulation is based on a
deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of lawyer
teamwork.
I.
A.

Two

LAWYERS AS TEAM WORKERS

MODELS OF LAWYERING

The framework for our understanding of lawyers comes
from many sources: personal experience, media reports, sociological studies, literature, anecdotes, and urban legends."
From this barrage of information we choose the material that
11. See, e.g., J. BRUMVALD, THE VANISHING HITCHHIKER. AMERicAN URBAN LEGENDS AND THEIR MEANINGS (1981) (introducing concept of urban legends); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 64 (1983) (asserting that concept of 'litigation explosion" is product of folklore).
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forms our image of lawyers. Although our vision of lawyers
has changed greatly over the past half century, perhaps the
most significant change concerns our sense of the lawyer as an
autonomous actor.
1.

Model One: The Lawyer as Autonomous Professional

For generations we based our image of the lawyer on a professional model. Central to this model is the notion of autonomy. Professionals can apply complex skills to social problems
only if they have discretion to select the manner in which their
services are rendered.' 2 In return they owe a duty to society to
exert a high degree of self-control, based on their individual
commitment to professional norms and values. 13
The complexity of professional work has led some organizational theorists to conclude that professionals are shielded
from internal, as well as external, control. 14 Although professionals are better able than outsiders to judge each other's
work, the degree of discretion involved in day-to-day tasks
makes it difficult for them to divide a task or to monitor each
15
other effectively.
On first glance lawyers fit well into this model. Like other
professionals they apply complex intellectual and social skills
12. D. RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOciTY 13 (1973). Rueschemeyer points out, however, that the model ignores governmental and legal
forms of control. Id. at 14; see also W. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLE AND
RULES 6 (1970) (professional uses own judgment in exercise of exceptional
knowledge); Kritzer, The Dimensions of Lawyer-Client Relations: Notes Toward a Theory and a Field Study, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 409, 413 ("At the
heart of the idea of autonomy is the image of the actor who is an independent
player in the relationship.") (emphasis in original); Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 590 (1985) (conventional definition of professionalism presupposes substantial degree of public commitment
and private autonomy); cf. Landon, Lawyers and Localities: The Interactionof
Community Context and Professionalism,1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 459, 46872 (size of lawyer's community affects nature of autonomy); Nelson, Ideology,
Practice,and ProfessionalAutonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships
in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503, 506 & n.16 (1985) (professional
autonomy is an "ambiguous concept that has been defined in numerous, inconsistent ways").
13. D. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 12, at 13.
14. See M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: SOcIAL ANALYSIS 190
(1977) (reluctance of professionals to sanction their colleagues); D. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 12, at 24 (internal stratification of bar and specialization
limit the "self-control which the profession is supposed to exercise according
to the model of professional autonomy"). See generally E. FREIDSON, supra
note 6, at 146, 154 (exploring reasons doctors do not engage in collegial
control).
15. See E. FREIDSON, supra note 6, at 122-29, 154.
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to resolve legal problems. Although they serve clients, their independent duty as officers of the court gives them a degree of
freedom from client control.1 6 Dealing with fluid and ambiguous matters, they have difficulty dividing their work or monitoring each other on a daily basis. Viewed from this
professional perspective, lawyers appear destined to work
alone. 17
The lawyer's professional code of ethics reinforces this autonomous image. As late as 1969, the Code of Professional Responsibility treated the lawyer as an individual operating in a
world of clients, courts, and society.18 Although the Code addressed some of the pressures faced by the profession, it ignored those generated by the economics and organization of a
lawyer's work.19
Even in 1969 this professional model did not reflect real20
ity.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, law-

16. See infra note 46 and accompanying text; see also D. RUESCHEMEYER,
supra note 12, at 23-25 (discussing factors that limit lawyer's independence
from client).
17. Half of all recent entrants to the bar try solo practice at some point in
their careers. E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 211 (citing B. CURRAN, Lawyer
Demographics, in THE LAWYERS ALmANAC 1982-1983, at 82 (1983)). Even
when not in solo practice, much of their work is done alone. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 7, at 118 (even in large private law firms, partner likely to supervise only a secretary and a few associates).
18.

See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 878 (1986) (Code projects

image of lawyer as sole practitioner).
19. The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility makes passing references both to firm practice, see, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2 (1980) (lawyer may disclose affairs of clients to firm partners or

associates), and to temporary associations, see, e.g., id. EC 2-22 (without consent of client, lawyer should not associate in particular matter another lawyer
outside firm); id. EC 4-2 (lawyer should not seek counsel from another lawyer
if it might reveal client confidences). The 1969 Code essentially ignores, however, lawyers who work together in corporate or government offices. See C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 878. Professor Charles Wolfram notes that the
Code "does not recognize . . . that the division of function and responsibility
within a firm can create both different and greater problems of professional
responsibility than those that confront a solo practitioner." Id. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA in 1983, attempt to correct
this deficiency by addressing the question of hierarchical authority within a
law firm. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 5.1 (1987) (re-

sponsibilities of partner or supervisory attorney); id. 5.2 (responsibilities of
subordinate attorney); id. 5.3 (responsibilities for nonlawyer assistants); see
also infra note 255.
Although the Model Rules were amended in 1987, they continue to be
known as the 1983 Model Rules. Citations in this Article to the current Model
Rules use the date of amendment.
20. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 878.
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yers had begun to shed some of the hypothetical autonomy of
the profession for more cooperative work arrangements. 21 As
institutional clients grew larger and their legal needs more
complex, their lawyers began to work within the larger institutional structures to provide more extensive services to their clients and more economic stability for themselves.2 2 Because the
professional model failed to account for these changes, an alternative picture of lawyers began to emerge. 23
2.

Model Two: The Lawyer as Organizational Professional

The vision of the lawyer has changed primarily in the last
twenty years as lawyers, legal scholars, and social scientists
have recognized the significant influence that clients and law24
yer groups have on the work practices of individual lawyers.
Such studies, focusing primarily on larger structures within
21. Id. at 877-78.
22. Id. (larger firms began to develop in late 19th century to help clients
handle complex litigation and growing government regulation). Two-thirds of
the bar now work within organizations of some sort, Rhode, supra note 12, at
590, usually for entities whose structure mirrors that of their clients. Id. at
631.
23. See Rhode, supra note 12, at 589-93 (exploring conflict between ideology of lawyer as autonomous public servant and bureaucratic realities of contemporary practice); see also Nelson, supra note 12, at 543 (changing
organization of legal work in corporate sector requires divergence from traditional ideology of professional autonomy).
24. For two relatively early empirical studies of lawyers working in
groups, see J. CARLIN, supra note 6 (examining social conditions and ethics of
Members of New York City Bar); E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964) (sociological study of Wall Street
firm). See generally Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPsON, supra note 7 (study of legal
profession in United States and England). By the 1970s studies of the sociology of the bar had become a growth industry. See, e.g., D. RUESCHEMEYER,
supra note 12 (comparing legal profession in Germany and United States); Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyeringin the Contemporary United States, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 152 (R. Dingwall & P. Lewis eds. 1983)
(analyzing distinctive style of law practice associated with, but not restricted
to, large law firms); Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests,
ProfessionalRoles, and Social Hierarchies,76 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (1978) (analyzing social structure of legal profession in Chicago); Kritzer, supra note 12
(setting forth three-dimensional framework for interpreting lawyer-client relationships: professional, business, and social); Landon, Clients, Colleagues,
and Community: The Shaping of Zealous Advocacy in Country Law Practice,
1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 81 (examining impact of small town practice on
practitioners' exercise of zealous advocacy); Laumann & Heinz, supra note 2
(discussing implications of specialization and co-practice in various fields of
law); Nelson, supra note 12 (asserting that large law firm lawyers' ideology of
autonomy has little bearing on their practice); Symposium on the Corporate
Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1984) (examining trends in organization of
corporate firm practice).
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which lawyers work, 25 have demonstrated that economic context can radically affect the ideal of professional autonomy. 26
We now recognize that the pressures on sole practitioners
serving their own client base significantly differ from those
faced by lawyers working for a firm, a corporation, or a government agency.27 We have also recognized the stratification of
the American bar into at least two groups, one consisting of
lawyers who work alone or in small groups with limited resources to serve individual persons,28 and a more powerful
group of lawyers who work within corporations or "megafirms"
to serve institutional clients.29 The image of the lawyer as an
25. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 878 (lawyers who serve single
large client face more pressure to defer to lawyer linking firm and client);
Heinz & Laumann, supra note 24, at 1113 (legal profession "shaped and structured by its clients"); Kritzer, supra note 12, at 410 (research shows corporate
sector of profession is, if anything, "more dependent on and constrained by clients than are lower-status lawyers who represent personal clients"); Nelson,
supra note 12, at 543 (changing organization of work in corporate sector increases divergence between ideology of professional autonomy and actual practice); Rhode, supra note 12, at 590, 594 (autonomous paradigm bears little
resemblance to daily practice; lawyers working within organizations are subject to norms peculiar to each setting).
27. See sources cited supra note 26; see also E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at
176 (trend toward replacement of varied clientele by single powerful employer); Rhode, supra note 12, at 627 (pressures to suspend normative judgment may intensify when attorney's status and income are closely tied to
representation of single patron or to success in particular proceeding).

28. See sources cited infra note 29. Lawyers sometimes serve individual
clients through larger groups, such as legal aid offices, clinics, and prepaid
legal plans. See, e.g., E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 144-74 (discussing work of
Legal Services lawyers); Cahn & Schneider, The Next Best Thing: Transferred
Clients in a Legal Clinic, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 367 (1987) (discussing impact of
transferred cases on student practice in legal clinic).
29. See, e.g., J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 23-25 (almost all large-firm lawyers in New York City serve major corporations); D. RUESCHEmEYER, supra

note 12, at 24 (division of bar into different client milieux); E. SPANGLER,
supra note 6 (lawyers working in firms, government agencies, or legal service
corporations operate under strikingly different working conditions from those
of corporate counsel); Galanter, supra note 24 (comparing practices serving institutional clients with practices serving individual clients); Kritzer, supra note
12 (distinguishing corporate services and personal services lawyers);
Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Proprietyof the Canons as a Group
Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968) (ethical canons appropriate for
large firms make practices of individual lawyers appear unethical). One study
identifies four separate types of legal practice: corporate litigators, corporate
office work, individual and small business litigators, and individual and small
business office work. Laumann & Heinz, supra note 2, at 246. They point out
that less than one-sixth of the lawyers in their study do substantial work for
both individual and corporate clients:
Unlike the task specialization that Durkheim associates with mutual
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independent public servant aiding a wide range of people has
changed to the image of a lawyer as entrepreneur, profit-maximizer, and handmaiden of powerful institutional interests.3 0
Not only do we see lawyers as less autonomous and more
bureaucratically arranged than the professional model suggests,
but we use organizational rhetoric to describe their mission.
Professors Edward Dauer and Arthur Leff, perhaps overstating
their case, have nevertheless captured the bureaucratic aspects
of lawyering:
Most lawyers are free-lance bureaucrats, not tied to any major establishment bureaucracy, who can be hired to use, typically in a bureaucratic setting, bureaucratic skills-delay, threat, wheedling, needling,
aggression, manipulation, paper passing, complexity, negotiation, selective surrender, almost-genuine passion-on behalf of someone unable or unwilling to do all that for himself. 3 1

Several changes have grown out of our recognition that
lawyers' skills straddle
two organizational camps, professionalism and bureaucracy. 32 The first is conceptual: we are building
a richer and more subtle lawyering model that takes context
into account.3 3 Using this model, we better appreciate the presinterdependence, this sort of division of labor may assign many lawyers to separate microenvironments that are so exclusively devoted to
the service of particular clienteles that they have little interest in or
dependence on lawyers who serve other sorts of clients.
Id. at 243-44 (citing E. DURK-EIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY 62 passim (G. Simpson trans. 1964)).
30. See Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A TheoreticalAppraisal of Litigation
Investment Decisions,15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 567, 575 (1980-1981) (arguing that
lawyer's primary goal is to maximize personal profits); Laumann & Heinz,
supra note 2, at 238 (profession's overall preoccupation lies with "business
transactions, transfers of wealth, and the defense of property rights. A mere
18 percent of the total legal effort [of the Chicago practitioners studied] is directed to fields concerned with the alleviation of personal problems ....").
31. Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer as Friend (Correspondence), 86 YALE L.J.
573, 581 (1977); see also Rhode, supra note 12, at 598 ("Many of the nation's
most eminent law firms are noted for their skill in genteel procrastination.").
32. See, e.g., M. LARSON, supra note 14, at 191 (suggesting much that is
characteristic of "professionalization" is consistent with bureacratization). See
generally Hall, Professionalizationand Bureaucratization,33 AM. Soc. REV.
92 (1968) (discussing impact of bureaucratization on professionals and effect of
introducing professionals into bureaucracy); Plumlee, Lawyers as Bureaucrats:
The Impact of Legal Training in the Higher Civil Service, 41 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 220 (1981) (discussing limited effect that legally trained civil servants
have on federal bureaucracy); Slovak, The Ethics of CorporateLawyers: A Sociological Approach, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 753, 758 (examining conflicts
faced by professionals working within bureaucratic structure).
33. Cf. J. CARUIN, supra note 6, at 58 (impact of type of practice on ethical
decisions facing lawyers); Rhode, supra note 12, at 591 (bar's concerns for individual dignity and trust not implicated in same way in all legal practice).
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sures that lawyers face as they negotiate the conflicting roles
and duties created by their position within our social institutions.34 The second change is normative: we are learning to
recognize that ethical norms and legal standards must be fitted
35
to meet the conditions under which lawyers work.
Despite this gradual emergence of the model of the lawyer
as institutional professional, we still cling to the notion that
lawyers accomplish their day-to-day activities alone. Although
surrounded by contradictory evidence, from the law school
graduates who fill the ranks of law firm associates to the
hordes of lawyers on the Bhopal streets, 36 we have not built a
picture of the smaller work-sharing team into the institutional-professional model. Instead we subscribe to the model of
lawyer individuality at the lowest level, ignoring the fact that
many lawyers do much, or even all, of their work in groups.
This addition to the model is crucial. Just as a large organizational structure affects how a lawyer's work is accomplished, work on smaller task-sharing teams necessarily affects
a lawyer's productivity and ethical behavior. Yet virtually no
one has acknowledged the pragmatic and ethical dimension of
such teamwork, the choices and the stresses faced when lawyers share their work.
Focusing on task-sharing teams provides a novel perspective on the problems faced by an institutional lawyer. Such
teams often cut across the institutional structures that are traditionally examined in a study of lawyer organizations. Tasksharing teams can be creatures of a firm or ad hoc creations put
34. Cf.Rhode, supra note 12, at 591 (study of legal ethics requires exploration of ideological and organizational context of legal practice).
35. Cf. Rotunda, Law, Lawyers and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT (C. Walton ed. 1977) (examining unique ethical problems facing corporate counsel); Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Discretion and
the Law of Legal Ethics: National Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1263 (ethical rules fail to recognize that different clients have different legal rights). See generally G. HAZARD, supra note 2 (examining ethical
dilemmas of corporate and government attorneys and impact of working in
teams on resolution of ethical problems); Greenebaum, Attorneys' Problems in
Making Ethical Decisions,52 IND. L.J. 627 (1977) (advocating analysis of attorney's ethical behavior as result of interaction between attorneys, clients, and
groups to which they belong); Rhode, supra note 12 (study of ethical dimensions of contemporary legal practice requires exploration of its ideological and
organizational context); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 Hum. RTS. 1, 12 (1975-1976) (arguing peculiar situation of criminal defense lawyer justifies behavior not appropriate for other types of lawyers).
36. See Teams of Lawyers PouringInto India, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Dec.
12, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
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together temporarily by individual lawyers.37 Whether sole
practitioners or employees of a large organization, lawyers
often do their lawyering in task-sharing teams. Although some
stresses are the product of the particular team, others appear
universal to lawyers who must work together. To understand
these pressures, we must first isolate and identify the stresses
of a practitioner working alone. The next section examines the
litigator's task in more detail.
B.

THE LAWYER'S TASK

Perhaps the most salient characteristic of a lawyer's task is
its ambiguity. Lawyers use a complex body of technical knowledge and skills to exercise judgment for clients regarding the
interpretation and application of human norms and values by
institutions. This interpretation rests on ambiguities about central values and has a fluid and uncertain outcome. If the task
involves litigation, it is also intense and adversarial, often with
an all-or-nothing outcome. To work effectively, then, lawyers
must make continuous, multiple judgments about highly ambiguous situations.38 These ambiguities fall into three classes:
task ambiguity, role ambiguity, and norm ambiguity. Although
overlapping, each category calls for a different type of judgment and exerts a different strain on the lawyer.
1.

Task Ambiguity

Although all professionals rely upon complex systems of
knowledge, the type of knowledge that lawyers use is unique:
The body of knowledge lawyers have a special competence in is
not--as in the case of medicine, physics, or engineering-concerned
with laws and regularities independent of human actions or intentions. Rather than natural laws, its subject matter are social norms
and rules for their application-norms and rules subject to deliberate
change as well as to interpretation and estimates of the likelihood
that they will be enforced....
... Furthermore, much of counsel's valued skills is not at all
based on his technical knowledge or is only tenuously linked to it....
Organizational "know-how," economic experience, wisdom about personal relations, connection, and "inside" knowledge are often as im39

portant for the lawyer's work as knowledge of the law.

37. See infra notes 68-96, 120-72 and accompanying text.
38. Cf. Nagel, Lawyer Decisionmaking and Threshold Analysis, 36 U.
Mum L. REV. 615 (1982) (applying threshold analysis to situations lacking accurate cost-benefit information).
39. D. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 12, at 23. Contrasting the kind of
knowledge used by doctors and lawyers, Eve Spangler wrote: "[S]cientific
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The contextual nature of legal work provides one key to
the ambiguity associated with this unique body of knowledge.
As one lawyer in Professor Eve Spangler's study pointed out:
One of the biggest things that law schools have [to do] is disabuse
many students [of] the notion that words are like numbers. We have
a lot of trouble with engineers in law school, people whose way of expressing themselves and whose mode of thought is in terms of mathematical equations. "Five is five." You get another word, they don't see
that it can change meaning in context so that in one sentence it
means almost the opposite of what it means in another sentence....
Even if you had the words that purported to answer [a particular
question] you'd have disagreements
about what the words mean in
40
that particular context.

In litigation the ability to grasp the essentials of a situation
and anticipate the relevant future possibilities encompasses a
series of complex case management decisions vitally tied to language and context. 41 Lawyers must decide which facts to
gather, retain, and use, and, equally important, which facts to
ignore. 42 They must assess the significance of legal precedents
for a particular case and choose the best presentation of legal
and factual arguments to key decision makers. Perhaps most
important, they must decide what the case is worth in order to
allocate available resources.
Few of these decisions are clear cut. Just as important as a
lawyer's decision about one of these matters is his decision
about the amount of time to invest in any particular issue. One
of the most uncertain aspects of litigation is the relative value
of a particular strategic action. 43 Much of a litigator's work will
not affect the suit's outcome, but he is never sure which detail
knowledge is objective, replicable, intrinsically suprahistorical and supracultural, while legal knowledge has none of these once-and-for-all qualities.
Rather, it is cultural knowledge: informed estimates about which arguments
will be persuasive in [a] specific jurisdiction under particular circumstances."
E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 184-85 (footnote omitted).
40. E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 185-86.
41. The lawyer's goal is productivity: "Modem lawyers often pride themselves on their general ability to grasp the essentials of a situation and to anticipate the relevant future possibilities, and another typical claim is that they
can 'get things done'-discreetly or deftly, as the case requires." Id.
42. Cf. Hazard & Rice, JudicialManagement of the Pretrial Process in
Massive Litigation: SpecialMasters as Case Managers, in MANAGING COMPLEX
LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 109 (1983)
(most of what lawyer does is preparing for eventualities that never happen).
43. Cf. Hazard & Rice, supra note 42, at 84 (good planning anticipates
flexibility and requires capacity for feeling one's way); Oakes, A Theoretical
Frameworkfor Lawyering Behavior and Techniques of Legal Diagnosis, 14
PAC. L.J. 243, 256-57 (1983) (applying medical concept of triage to lawyer's case
evaluation decisions).
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will turn out to be crucial. This all-or-nothing aspect of litigation puts great pressure on a lawyer trying to serve a client
competently and efficiently."
2.

Role Ambiguity

One of the most important decisions for a lawyer is how to
order his various roles. A lawyer has a professional duty to the
client,4 5 to the court,4 and to society.4 7 A lawyer may also be
constrained by self-interest and obligations to family, employer,
partners, and other social or work groups.4 8 Each role contains
internal ambiguities. For instance, the lawyer's duty to the client may be problematic when the client's short-term goals,
such as winning "at any cost," conflict with other long-term client goals, such as economic survival. 4 9 In addition, the obligations of one role often conflict with the obligations of a
44. See Gould, "Burnout'" Law and Disorder,Nat'l L.J., Apr. 30, 1984, at
13, col. 1, 17, col. 4, 19, col. 1, reprinted in S. GILLERS & N. DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHIcs 643, 646 (1985) (inability to
control ultimate outcome lowers lawyer autonomy and raises stress).
45. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 comment
(1987) (attorney must "act with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf").
46. See, e.g. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrTY DR 7102(B)(1) (1980) (lawyer must reveal client's fraud to tribunal if client refuses
and information not privileged); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1987) (lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements to tribunal); Control Data Corp. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 87
F.R.D. 377, 379 (D.D.C. 1980) (counsel must observe duty as officer of court to
secure just, speedy, and inexpensive judicial determinations).
47. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7102(A)(5) (1980) (lawyer shall not "knowingly make a false statement of law
or fact"); id. EC 7-1 (duty of lawyer to client and to legal system is to represent client zealously within bounds of law); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1987) (lawyer shall not misstate material fact or law to
third person); id. Rule 8.4(c) (lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"). Some commentators have deplored the fact that these codes of professional responsibility put too little emphasis on the lawyer's duty to the court and to society. See Fay, Offjwers of the
Court, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1986, at 9, 10-11 (historical concept of lawyer's duty as
"officer of the court" hardly visible in 1969 Model Code or in 1983 Model
Rules); Rhode, supra note 12, at 595-605 (profession has failed to resolve the
contradiction between fidelity to client and to legal system as whole).
48. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 8-9 (identifying many "others,"
besides client and court, to whom lawyer may owe duty); W. WEYRAUCH, THE
PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 141 (1964) (lawyers' behavior controlled not just by
canons of professional ethics, but by informal social taboos); Kritzer, supra
note 12, at 410 (what is in lawyer's economic self-interest may not be in client's
interest).
49. See generally Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REv. 316 (1987) (when
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competing role.5 0 The most familiar and formidable example of
these conflicts is that between the lawyer's duty to the client
and to the court. 51 A lawyer must cope with role ambiguity on
two levels: determining how much time and energy are needed
to clarify goals and options, and deciding how to accommodate,
or choose among, competing duties. Given the difficulty of both
tasks, it is not surprising that many lawyers ignore the role am52
biguity that permeates their work.
3.

Norm Ambiguity

To some extent ethical rules and legal norms circumscribe
a lawyer's choices about case management and role conflict. On
closer inspection, however, many norms that appear to guide a
lawyer's choices are themselves ambiguous,5 3 adding further
stress to the lawyering task.-4 For example, our society has
confronted by competing goals, client, not lawyer, should decide what is in client's best interest).
50. See Cox, The Lawyer's Public Reponsibilities, 4 HUM. RTS. 1 (1974)
(examining conflicts faced by lawyer in public office); Gould, supra note 44, at
19, col. 1, reprintedin S. GILLERs & N. DoasEN, supranote 44, at 647 (discussing contribution of role ambiguity to lawyer burnout).
51. See, e.g., S. GuiLs & N. DORSEN, supra note 44, at 372 (discussing
conflict between duty to client and duty to avoid fraud on court); Rieger, Client Perjury: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutionaland Ethical Issues,
70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 122-28 (1985) (discussing conflicting obligations of attorney convinced that client intends to commit perjury); see also In re A, 276 Or.
225, 239-40, 554 P.2d 479, 487 (1976) (lawyer who made good-faith attempt to
resolve immediate conflict between duty to protect lawyer-client confidentiality and duty to prevent fraud on court not subject to discipline).
52. See, e.g., Hazard, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? (Book Review), 95
YALE L.J. 1523, 1529 (1986) ('"e
defense lawyer's avoidance of knowledge
that incriminates his client provides an escape from the contradiction between
the cognitive and normative reality of personal knowledge, and the cognitive
and normative tableaus that the law uses as the basis for adjudication."); Wasserstrom, supra note 35, at 5 (lawyer's role as client advocate allows attorneys
to separate themselves from wider moral implications of their actions). Professional responsibility casebooks generally ignore these conflicts as well. See
Chemerinsky, Pedagogy Without Purpose: An Essay on ProfessionalResponsibility Courses and Casebooks, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 189, 191.
53. Rhode, supra note 12, at 628 ('While the pressures for normative compromise vary across practice settings, the data ... suggest that litigation can
generate unusual levels of moral smog.").
54. Cf. Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective
Self-Improvement: Competence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 WIS. L.
REV.639, 659 ("The Code of Professional Responsibility can best be understood
as an uneasy truce among a number of competing and even inconsistent values
.... The Code cannot provide clear answers to difficult questions precisely
because it always points in multiple directions."); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 67-68 (1980) (lawyer's judgment in achieving coherence among conflicting values is skill which must be
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provided notoriously inadequate guidelines as to the extent of
negative information that lawyers must reveal to opponents or
the court about their clients. The ethical norms 55 and legal
rules 56 that control these issues are vague or contradictory, revealing society's ambivalence about the conflict between advocacy and truth seeking.57 Although we recognize the existence
learned and practiced in moral as well as legal tasks); Rhode, supra note 12, at
618 ("For lawyers in practice, the appeal of agnosticism often increases. Pure

victims and villains are hard to come by; factual uncertainties, extenuating circumstances, and normative dissonance confound all but the rarest cases."). On
the other hand, some lawyers fear that a clearer but more rigorous code of
ethics would create even more serious stresses. See sources cited in Rhode,
supra note 12, at 647 n.178.
55. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(1987) (disclosure permitted only to prevent client from criminal act likely to
result in substantial bodily harm); id. Rule 3.3(a) (disclosure of client perjury
or other wrongdoing before tribunal required); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at
668-71 (1969 Code ignores "collision course" created by confidentiality and disclosure requirements; Model Rules also sharply inconsistent); Nelson, supra
note 12, at 541 ("whistle-blowing" proposal allowing lawyer to prevent client
from inflicting bodily harm to another was most hotly contested issue in ABA
House of Delegates consideration of proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct); Rhode, supra note 12, at 614 (disclosure standards have been "riddled with exceptions and indeterminacies"); Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the
Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REv. 455, 467-70, 473-74 (1984)
(disclosure standards of Model Code, ABA ethics committee opinions, and
Model Rules unclear); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 811,
837 n.105 (1977) (formal regulations of legal profession "speak in barely detectable whispers about perjury" and opinion of ABA ethics committee regarding
client perjury provide "an array of inconsistent options"). Compare MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1980) (if lawyer
knows client has perpetrated fraud on tribunal, lawyer shall call upon client to
rectify it and reveal fraud to tribunal if client refuses) with id. DR 4-101 (1980)
(lawyer shall not knowingly reveal confidence or secret of client); compare id.
DR 4-101(A) (principle of confidentiality) with id. DR 4-101(C) (principle of
disclosure).
56. See, e.g., MacCarthy & Mejia, The PerjuriousClient Question: Putting
CriminalDefense Lawyers Between a Rock and a HardPlace,75 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1197 (1984) (discussing attorney's conflicting obligations to clients and to court); Rieger, supra note 51 (discussing conflicting obligations of
attorney convinced client about to commit perjury); Shapiro, Some Problems
of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1055 (1979) (noting
sharply divergent views among prominent civil procedure scholars, as well as
among practitioners, about level of disclosure legally required in response to
discovery request).
57. C. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 264, 279 (1979) (discussing conflict between duty to client and duty to
seek truth); Rhode, supra note 12, at 615 (some qualified responsibility to third
parties might improve system); Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1071, 1088-90 (discussing ambiguous nature of work product rule); Trustee's Criticism of Lawyers in O.P.M. Imbroglio, Legal Times, May 2, 1983, at 20 (decrying ABA's
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of such ambiguities, 5 we have not fully explored the impact of
normative uncertainty on litigators.5 9
C.

GROUP DYNAMCS AND THE LAWYERiNG TASK

Task sharing among lawyers relieves the stress of certain
types of ambiguity but heightens others. Working together creates economic efficiencies. Lawyers can specialize, channel clients among themselves, and undertake tasks too large for a
single lawyer. Specialization permits the lawyer to focus on a
narrow area of law, thus limiting the lawyer's exposure to
novel issues and increasing expertise.60 Channeling clients
among several lawyers reduces lawyers' gatekeeping expenses
and increases the amount of time devoted to delivery of services. 61 Grouping provides lawyers with a vehicle in which to improve their information gathering and analytical skills, exercise
informed decision making,62 and meet the stringent time revote not to permit fuller disclosure of client's illegal activities as "outrageous
and irresponsible").
58. See Lefstein, IncriminatingPhysicalEvidence, the Defense Attorney's
Dilemma, and the Need for Rules, 64 N.C.L. REV. 897 (1986); Schwartz, The
Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543; Note, Legal Ethics
and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979); Kaufman, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1504 (1981) (reviewing A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL
FOUNDATION OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1980)).

59. For sensitive treatments of the question, see Brazil, The Attorney as
Victim. Toward More CandorAbout the PsychologicalPrice Tag of Litigation
Practice, 3 J. LEG. PROF. 107 (1978); Hazard, supra note 52; see also Gould,
supra note 44, at 13, col. 1, reprintedin S. GLLEs & N. DORSEN, supra note
44, at 643 (raising issue of lawyer burnout); Rhode, supra note 12, at 629 (conflicts produce "cognitive dissonance" that usually results in behavior favoring
clients).
60. As in all professions, the growing technical complexity of law lends itself to collaboration among specialists who work together to serve a particular
client. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 7, at 154-55; E. SMIGEL,
supra note 24, at 149-54.
61. See generally McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring, and Profit
Sharing in Law Firms: An Alternative Hypothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 379,
388-90 (1982) (promoting recognition in profit sharing of decreased client production costs through team delivery of legal services).
62.

See, e.g., P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT. TASKS, REsPONSIBILrTIEs, PRAC-

TICES 472 (1973) (effective decision grows out of clash of divergent opinions);
Stasser & Titus, Pooling of UnsharedInformation in Group Decision Making:
Biased Information Sample During Discussion, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 1467 (1985) (discussion can help decision-making group when
members have incomplete or biased information); cf. Brazil, Special Masters in
the PretrialDevelopment of Big Cases: Potentialand Problems, in MANAGING
COMPLEx LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS,

supra note 42, at 37 (discussing advantages of decision making by team of special masters).
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quirements of their work,63 thus improving the outcome for clients with complex legal problems.
Despite these advantages, group work also adds another
layer to the complex stresses faced by lawyers. Whenever lawyers work in a group, they must process information and divide
responsibility in a manner that permits members to work to capacity. This division of labor presents difficult problems for
any task-sharing group, whether comprised of soldiers, social
service workers, or corporate officials.6 The high level of ambiguity in the lawyer's job, however, may magnify the problem.
Complex decisions about task management, roles, and norms,
usually made by a single professional, must now be made by a
number of people, working within a model based on professional autonomy yet committed to a group goal.
The problems of lawyer teams fall into three general areas:
division of responsibility, information transmission, and conflict
avoidance. How do lawyers divide decision-making authority
among themselves when each part of the task is related to
other parts and each lawyer bears responsibility for both his
work and the work of others? If every decision about task,
role, and norm depends on the interpretation of language and
social context, how much of the context and their own interpretation of that context will lawyers transmit to other team
members? Equally problematic are questions of boundary
drawing and dispute resolution: how do lawyers manage the
conflicts that inevitably arise from different interpretations of
their work, the roles that they play, and the norms that guide
them? After examining these three dimensions of team lawyering, we must ask the difficult underlying normative ques63. For an example of common, although disturbing, use of lawyer teamwork to relieve the time constraints of litigation practice, see Maddi, Improving TrialAdvocacy: The Views of TrialAttorneys, 1981 AM. B. FOuND. REs. J.
1049 (discussing practice of firm assignment of pretrial motion hearings to

firm's junior members, rotation of files among lawyers on basis of convenience, availability, and necessity, and forwarding of cases to trial lawyers just
prior to, or on day of, trials).
64. See generally CRrrICAL STuDIEs iN ORGANIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY

(F. Fischer & C. Sirianni eds. 1984) (presenting competing theories of organizational and bureaucratic structure); D. FUNK, GROUP DYNAIc LAw (1982)
(analyzing relationship between organization's rules and its group dynamics);
J. HAGE, THEORiES OF ORGANIZATIONS: FORM, PROCESSES, AND TRANSFORMATION (1980) (discussing relationship between organizational form and power,
change, personnel, and society); Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful
OrganizationalBehavior, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1377, 1394 (1982) (group organization and specialization diffuses knowledge and responsibility, increasing opportunity for unlawful activity).
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tion: do current forms of lawyer teams represent a healthy
accommodation of the conflicts between professional autonomy
and group process?
The next part of the Article looks at the processes adopted
by four litigation teams. Moving from a small ad hoc team to
teams of broader scope, intensity, and complexity,6 it examines
the behavior of lawyer teams similar to those in current legal
practice. All are litigation teams, partly because they are the
most common and visible, but also because litigation teams
span the great divide that separates corporate lawyers from
those who primarily represent individuals. 66 Two teams are hypothetical; the descriptions of the other two teams are amalgamations based on published reports of real lawyer teams.
Although each team differs, certain shared tensions concerning
information management, conflict resolution, and the division
of authority confirm that all task-sharing lawyer teams confront common stresses that must be recognized and addressed.
II.

FOUR LAWYER TEAMS

A.

SMALL AD Hoc TEAm

1.

Illustration

Lawyer A, a partner in a small personal injury firm, is handling a claim arising out of an automobile accident. She negotiates a settlement with the alleged tortfeasor but thinks that her
client has a malpractice claim against the physician who treated
her client after the accident. She refers the client to Lawyer B,
a lawyer practicing in the city where the physician lives, to
whom Lawyer A has occasionally referred cases for a percentage of the fee. Over the next few years, A occasionally talks
with the client and writes B to check on the suit's progress.
Lawyer B, a member of a two-partner firm, has a busy
commercial practice and modestly successful trial practice that
often sends her out of town. After meeting the client, she assigns the file to an associate recently graduated from law
65. This view of teams is necessarily limited because it only focuses on
private-sector lawyers working by themselves or within firms. Although many
of the problems encountered by these lawyers are duplicated within the litigation teams that work within such institutions as government agencies, corporations, or legal service offices, the study does not examine the processes unique
to those groups. See generally E. SPANGLER, supra note 6 (examining work
patterns of lawyers in variety of institutional settings); Gilboy & Schmidt,
supra note 6 (criminal lawyers); Maddi, supra note 63 (trial lawyers).
66. See supra note 29.
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school. Over a period of two years, under B's general supervi-

sion, the associate conducts limited discovery, focusing on the
physician's negligence during the client's initial examination after the accident. B prosecutes the claim before a state mediation panel that finds the physician "not negligent" based on the
testimony of the defendant's expert witness. B explains to the
client that the panel's finding may reduce her success at trial,
but that she still has a good chance of recovery before a jury.
The client advances part of her settlement money to cover trial
preparation expenses.
B files suit. As time for trial nears, she contacts Lawyer C,
a successful trial attorney with whom she has worked before. B

has five personal injury cases nearing trial that she asks C to
handle. She takes five files to C's office in a large cardboard
box, and after a brief conversation, C agrees to "look the files

over." No discussion as to the division of responsibility and authority ever takes place.

C examines the files, meets once with the client, instructs
her law clerk to research the law and ask plaintiff's expert witness certain questions about the witness's testimony at the mediation panel. After this, C writes a brief progress report to B.
She also prepares a Notice of Appearance but does not file it,
for reasons she cannot later recall. According to the law clerk's

report, the plaintiff's expert witness testimony will be equivocal at best. This uncertainty leads C to suggest to the client
that the case be abandoned before further expenses are incurred. While the client is considering C's recommendation,
the defendant files a motion for involuntary dismissal on the
67
ground that the suit has been inactive for twelve months.
Suit is dismissed with prejudice. A flurry of letters passes between A, B, and C in which past events are reconstructed and
recorded and recriminations are exchanged.
Client sues B and C for malpractice. C's attorney, a seasoned malpractice defense lawyer, concludes after some investigation that the client had a valid malpractice claim against the
physician for improper follow-up treatment. Although B's associate addressed this theory briefly during discovery, none of the
lawyers pursued the issue. The malpractice suit is settled.
67. See, eg., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(e) (providing for involuntary dismissal
of action when no record activity has occurred for one year).
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2. Discussion: Small Ad Hoc Team
The trial association team is at once the simplest and most
complex lawyer team. Limited in duration and scope, it is
nonetheless a difficult vehicle for coordinating tasks because it
exists outside a larger organizational framework.
Lawyers serving individuals commonly pass responsibility
for a particular piece of litigation among several practitioners.
Lawyers do not limit this practice to plaintiffs' personal injury
cases. England institutionalized associational teamwork in its
solicitor-barrister dichotomy, 68 and cross-institutional teams

frequently handle criminal defense and corporate litigation in
America. 69 Such teamwork increases lawyer productivity by
permitting generalist lawyers serving a large client base to
draw on the expertise of litigation specialists or local counsel
without losing their clients entirely. 70
By definition, the ad hoc associative team is not permanent,
but a collaboration of limited focus and moderate duration.
Lawyers work cooperatively for a particular client with a particular claim. Because of this impermanence, lawyers must establish new rules for teamwork with each case. 71
Lawyer teamwork requires careful division of authority
and information management. Because the progress of a case is
cumulative, it is never clear whose steps will ultimately prove
most significant to the case's outcome. Therefore, each knows
68. See Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HoPsON, supra note 7, at 357-98.
69. See, e.g., Aibel, Successful Teaming of Inside and Outside Counsel to
Serve the Corporate Client, 38 Bus. LAw. 1587 (1983) (discussing requisites of
successful teaming of inhouse and outside corporate counsel); Gilboy &
Schmidt, supra note 6, at 4-6 (defendants are represented by different lawyers
at pretrial and trial stages in 60% of felony cases reaching trial courts in Chicago; 45% of criminal defendants represented by private lawyers are represented sequentially); Mounts, supra note 6 (public defender programs);
Nelson, supra note 2, at 130 (use of inside and outside counsel). Serial lawyering can also occur in clinical and legal services settings. See E. SPANGLER,
supra note 6, at 154-66; Cahn & Schneider, supra note 28.
70. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 877 (describing pressures on solo
practitioners: "With only the time, experience, learning, ability, and clientele
of one lawyer to go around, [they often] ... perform too little research, and
sometimes lose or upset clients because of inability to perform specialized or
multilawyer tasks."); Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6, at 9 (some lawyers limit
themselves to one stage of litigation for economic reasons: large case volume,
no trials, and defendants less apt to run out of money).
71. See Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6, at 13 (sequential representation
works better inside lawyer organization because second lawyer can judge work
of prior lawyer, ask for information, and sanction bad work by letting her dissatisfaction filter through to supervisor).
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her responsibilities, has the information necessary to make case
management decisions, appreciates the significance of her acts
to the outcome, and transmits relevant gathered information to
other lawyers who need it. To remain efficient, however, the
group process must not call for extensive lawyer-lawyer
contact.
If competent delivery of service is a primary goal,72 we
might expect team members to attempt to clarify each member's area of responsibility and to develop some mechanism for
exchanging information about the substantive and procedural
aspects of the case. Social scientists recognize such opportunities for discussion and information exchange as a major component of good decision making.7 3 They advise lawyers to plan
carefully and coordinate when working together.7 4
Yet such discussions are more often the exception than the
rule. The lawyers on this ad hoc team spent almost no time
discussing case management and avoided almost all contact during the life of the case. They adopted a form of "stage" or "serial" representation: 75 the lawyer holding the file had the case,
while the other lawyers dropped into the background. Each
lawyer handled the case for a limited period. When she perceived that she could no longer handle it competently and economically, the lawyer passed the case on, expanding the team
and reducing her expected recovery. During the period that
each lawyer handled the case, she essentially acted as a sole
practitioner. Because the lawyers did not discuss the case
among themselves, they lost the benefits of shared thinking or
each other's experience. Although all shared legal and ethical
responsibility to the client, 76 they left unsettled almost all questions of authority, responsibility, and coordination.
The lawyers' failure to coordinate authority and information sharing contributed directly to the suit's dismissal. Had
these lawyers fully discussed the case at some point, they might
72. See Garth, supra note 54.
73. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING 11 (1977); sources cited

supra note 62.
74. See Aibel, supra note 69, at 1590, 1597 ("full and frank discussion"
needed for successful teaming of inside and outside counsel; they must meet
regularly and clarify scope of work, division of labor, ultimate responsibility,
and costs); see also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 650 F. Supp. 324,
329 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (recognizing that when lawyers work together, "time well
spent in conference can prevent the unnecessary duplication of effort sometimes caused by poor communication").
75. See Mounts, supra note 6, at 484.

76. See infra note 84.
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have developed a clearer view of its strengths and weaknesses,
including the overlooked theory of negligent follow-up care.
Furthermore, they might have avoided the procedural dismissal
caused by each lawyer's assumption that someone else was responsible for the suit's procedural viability.7 7
Several factors contribute to this lack of coordination. Perhaps the most important factor is the difficulty of coordinating
information flow and planning when work is fragmented, particularly across organizational boundaries. In cases involving
substantial sums, such as corporate litigation handled jointly by
inhouse and outside counsel, lawyers may invest the time
needed to clarify the division of authority and to devise means
to transmit information, even though the task is extraordinarily difficult. 78 But ad hoc teams frequently share marginal
cases, such as this one, brought for relatively powerless clients.79 Lawyers often take such cases on a contingency basis,
carrying a number of them at once.80 Lawyers working together on such cases may find team coordination too difficult,
77. Still, this criticism may be Monday-morning quarterbacking.
Although the outcome of the suit ultimately turned on the lack of file activity
and the issue of the proper medical follow-up, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, these problems are obvious only in hindsight. At the time the lawyers probably could not have separated these issues from many others that
seemed equally or even more compelling. It might have taken a significant investment of time and energy for them to cover the bases necessary to identify
these two issues and to see that they were properly addressed.
78.

See J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS (1983) (examples of inside and outside

counsel cooperation); Aibel, supra note 69, at 1597. Because corporations h ave
begun to keep more of their business inhouse, or distribute it among firms,
outside counsel for major corporations have begun to find themselves in shortrange, one-shot relationships with their clients. Nelson, supra note 2, at 13033; see also Chayes & Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REv. 277, 294 (1985) (outside counsel tend to be more hired guns, less
members of ongoing relationship, as their functions are internalized); Freund,
Comment on "Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm," 37 STAN. L. RExv.
301, 303 (1985) (commenting on benefits of retaining outside counsel); Lochner, Comment on "Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm," 37 STAN. L.
REV. 305, 308-09 (1985) (discussing relationship between inside and outside
counsel).
79. See J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 66-73. See generally Shuchman, supra
note 29, at 245-46 (Canons of Ethics better suited to large firms than small
firms).
80. Professor John Coffee has pointed out that it is not uncommon for a
plaintiff's lawyer to carry a large portfolio, invest little in each case, and attempt to settle as many cases as possible. See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 22-23; see also infra note 157 (plaintiffs' lawyers
tend to work within smaller, less stable organizations). The advantage of this
approach to the client is that someone is willing to take the case at all; how-
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frustrating, and time-consuming to invest the time and money
needed to fine-tune their collaborative efforts.8 ' Adoption of
the simplest method possible-serial representation with little
or no communication-saves valuable time, making it economically feasible to accept such cases at all. 2
Yet these lawyers could not disentangle themselves entirely after they passed on the case. Lawyer A, as the intake or
client's lawyer, talked to the client and communicated occasionally with B and C, the process lawyers. A client-process division is fairly common in association relationships.8 3 Yet
Lawyer A did not turn the case over entirely, primarily because
she wanted to participate enough to justify her fee" and retain
ever, the cost may be steep because case management may well be minimal,
even if only one lawyer handles the case from start to finish.
81. See J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 66-72 (describing lawyer treatment of
lower-status clients); Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6, at 15 (even when lawyers have opportunity to cooperate, first lawyer may have little information to
transfer if he spent little time on case or recalls little about it).
82. But see Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangements on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 251, 267 (1985) (empirical
data suggest hourly-fee lawyers put more time into cases than contingent-fee
lawyers only if case worth less than $30,000).
83. See, e.g., Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., 108
F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985) (local and general counsel); Bodily v. Intermountain
Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986) (same); Pollack v. Lytle,
120 Cal. App. 3d 931, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1981) (pretrial and trial counsel); Ortiz
v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 278 S.E.2d 833 (1981) (three lawyers working on case
successively); see also Lochner, supra note 78, at 309-11 (one of most important
roles for inside counsel is transmitting information about client's values and
style to outside counsel, who lacks ongoing relationship with client needed for
such knowledge).
84. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmIIrY DR 2-107 (1979)
(attorney cannot divide fee with nonmember of firm unless such division made
pursuant to client consent and based upon services performed and responsibility assumed); see also Altschul v. Sayble, 83 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161-63, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 716, 719-21 (1978) (fee-splitting contract unenforceable as contrary to
public policy); In re Kaye, 24 A.D. 345, 348-49, 266 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (App. Div.
1966) (referring negligence cases and retaining percentage of contingent fee
without regard to work performed held misconduct), appealdenied, 17 N.Y.2d
422, 216 N.E.2d 32, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1966), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 386 U.S. 17 (1967). Ethics committees and individual practitioners
have hotly debated the ethicality of receiving referral fees when day-to-day
task responsibility is not shared. See McChesney, Commercial Speech in the
Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable
Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 70 n.132 (1985) ('"The bar has never adequately
explored the value of referral fees to both sellers and consumers ...
[Rieferrals are merely a way of accomplishing between lawyers in different
firms exactly what happens every day between lawyers in the same firm.");
Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L.
REV. 702, 793 (1977).
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her client.8 5 Thus her position remained ambiguous: to the client she appeared to participate in the suit, and she was legally
and ethically responsible for the outcome,8 6 but she did not actually contribute to its prosecution.
Lawyers B and C divided the work through a serial split
between pretrial and trial stages, 7 symbolically achieved with
the file's delivery to C. Although fairly clear in the abstract,
the lines of division between B and C are also ambiguous.
Their behavior reflected this fuzziness: by delivering the file, B
symbolically turned the sword over to C. But the delegation
was not clear because the file was one of a batch, C promised
only to "look it over," and B remained attorney of record.8 8 Because of this ambiguity, neither lawyer took full responsibility
for overseeing the suit.
At best, the lawyers' teamwork was marginal. Although
sharing case responsibility, they did not work collaboratively;
the very purpose of associating counsel was to move the case
into other hands. They invested little time on the case after the
transfer and would have had difficulty monitoring each others'
decisions because of distance anyway. Because lawyers A, B,
and C could not collaborate economically, they formed a super85. This is probably a minor concern when, as here, the client will probably have little repeat work. See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
95, 97, 100-01 (1974).
86. Although her exact degree of responsibility is not clear, see infra
notes 257-65 and accompanying text, courts are increasingly holding referring
attorneys responsible for the acts of associated counsel. See, eg., Tormo v.
Yormack, 398 F. Supp. 1159, 1169-70 (D.N.J. 1975) (attorney who transfers client's case to another counsel is under duty to exercise due care to ensure retained counsel is competent and trustworthy).
87. See generally Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6 (sequential representation common in criminal practice); Mounts, supra note 6 (same regarding public defender programs). Professor Judith Resnik sees the Federal Rules as
fostering this split in civil cases. See Resnik, FailingFaiti Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 522 (1986) (1983 Rules created opportunities for a "new set of lawyers, 'litigators,' who did their work (motions,
deposition, and interrogatory practice) during the pretrial process and who
were to be distinguished from 'trial lawyers,' who actually conducted trials.").
88. Status as attorney of record is often considered crucial by courts in determining the extent of an associated lawyer's responsibility. See J.M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338, 348 n.5 (D. Conn. 1981) (" '[Tihe
buck stops with the attorney's appearance as counsel of record.'" (citing Maryland Metals v. Harbaugh, 33 Md. App. 570, 576, 365 A.2d 600, 603 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1976))). But see Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 127-28, 278 S.E.2d 833, 838
(1981) (appearance as counsel of record does not make associated counsel liable for another attorney's malpractice when associated counsel's services were
clearly intended by both attorneys to be of limited scope).
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ficial relationship in which they distanced themselves from
each other and from their case responsibilities.
B and C also added another team layer by assigning important case preparation duties to employees. Although lawyers
frequently delegate pretrial preparation to associates and
clerks, they usually limit the responsibility to routine assignments to keep information-gathering and decision-making responsibility in the hands of those who appreciate the
significance of such responsibility. Because this case was marginal, however, these lawyers could not delegate so carefully and
could not supervise so closely their subordinates' work. Thus
each relinquished a crucial aspect of the case-the discussions
with the expert witness-to inexperienced lawyers. Delegation
of authority increased the risk that B and C would lose critical
information, as they in fact did.
Serial division and task assignment to poorly supervised
subordinates have important ethical implications because they
increase the risk of poor case management. Critics have
pointed out the dangers of serial or stage litigation in public defender work.89 Lawyers handling only part of a case, the critics
argue, tend to have limited perspective.90 Without responsibility for the entire case, they may fail to relate to the client or to
focus on the case as a whole and may lose information and
make decisions that endanger the subsequent prosecution of
the case. 91 As the hypothetical suggests, similar problems can
occur in any case handled through serial representation, partic92
ularly if the lawyers consider the case marginal.
89. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6; Mounts, supra note 6; see also Moore

v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (although specialization in
stages may promote efficiency and provide expert service, it also raises "risks
of a loss of the close confidential relationship between litigant and counsel and
the subordination of an individual client's interest to the larger interests of the
organization"). But see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (sixth amendment does not guarantee "meaningful relationship" between client and
counsel).
90. See, e.g., Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6, at 24-25 (sequential representation often adversely affects case preparation because information is lost
or distorted).
91. Id. at 1-3; Mounts, supra note 6, at 485.
92. See E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 129 (lawyers' work does not lend
itself to standardization and division of labor because one person must know
entire case). Commentators have also noted that the efficiencies to be
achieved by dividing work among more experienced attorneys and their associates may be lost if lawyers lack resources to provide sufficient supervision. Cf.
Maddi, supra note 63, at 1053 (meaningful supervision of trial work unlikely in
cases of small firm or sole practitioner).
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This point is vividly illustrated in the way that this lawyer
team handled the substantive side of the client's case. Lawyer
A did not assume any responsibility for the substantive case;
she talked with the client but failed to pass on what she
learned to B. Lawyers B and C delegated the preliminary investigation and evaluation to inexperienced employees who did
not recognize the significance of the client's follow-up treatment and thus did not pursue it with the plaintiff's expert witness. Although B and C might have made the same error,
closer examination could have brought this line of investigation
to their attention. B simply did not bother, perhaps because
she did not worry about how to prove the case at trial.93 C, perhaps assuming that all medical theories had been explored and
viewing the case as a "loser" because of the unfavorable mediation outcome, put less effort into gathering and analyzing facts
than she might have if she had handled the pretrial stages of
the suit.
Diffusion of authority among several lawyers is the gravest
drawback of team lawyering. If a single lawyer handles a case
and gives it only marginal attention, she cannot blind herself
entirely to the ethical implications of her actions. At some
level she recognizes that she alone is responsible for this client
and this case. Multiple lawyers, on the other hand, may find it
easier to deny personal responsibility for a lowered standard of
care by justifying their part in handling (or mishandling) the
case as the best that could be done given their limited role.
Thus, the client-process, pretrial-trial, and attorney-associate
divisions sometimes distance lawyers from their client and
their craft.
93.

Although she needed to present the case to the mediation panel, she

may have done so with minimal preparation. Plaintiffs' lawyers sometimes re-

gard mediation as a technical hurdle, erected by defendants, on the way to the
jury. Hence they frequently will not even offer testimony. See Herrera v.
Doctor's Hosp., 360 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (state may require mediation as prerequisite to filing medical malpractice suit, but cannot
force plaintiff to present evidence at hearing if plaintiff feels that it would be
wasteful because she plans to file civil suit regardless of outcome); see also
Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1316-17 (1978) (lawyers' decisions regarding
discovery are based on prior determination whether case is likely to settle; if
settlement thought likely, lawyers will not engage in full discovery that will
expose weaknesses of their case); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 113, 122 (1983)
(because plaintiffs get higher return from strategy oriented toward settlement
than one geared to formal adjudication, bargaining is most cost-effective activity for plaintiff).
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Summary: Small Ad Hoc Team

One gets the impression from this example that the client
was lost in the pile of lawyers working on her case. Over a
three-year period, four different lawyers represented her serially and concurrently; none assumed complete control over the
case's progress. Although it might appear to stretch reality to
call the interactions of these lawyers teamwork, they shared responsibility for their client's malpractice claim. Until immediately before dismissal, each suggested that the case was worth
the time and money expended, perhaps because no one wanted
to tell the client otherwise. Yet because of each supervising attorney's marginal effort, the client's suit was substantively and
procedurally mishandled. No single decision was particularly
extraordinary, and yet one doubts that these four lawyers
would have acted in the same fashion if they had devised a
management plan early in the suit. Serious slippage occurred
both within the individual firms and the interorganizational division of responsibility.
Most ad hoc litigation teams successfully and efficiently
represent clients. Similarly, this client could have had the
same negative experience if only one lawyer or firm had handled her suit.94 Still, it seems clear that this division of responsibility can weaken the rendition of legal services if not
carefully monitored by every participating lawyer. What remains unclear is how such monitoring can be effectively and efficiently achieved in cross-organizational teamwork.
Ethical dilemmas faced by these lawyers are, to a large extent, the product of economic forces. To survive financially,
lawyers must carry a large number of cases and divide their
major resource-time-among the cases as best they can.95
They delegate responsibility to inexperienced assistants, divide
the case serially with other lawyers, and ignore the type of
communication and supervision necessary to assure good case
94. Indeed, the fact that several lawyers were involved in mishandling the
case probably helped the client discover the poor service.
95. See, e.g., E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 200 ("Often it seems that
neither [the sole practitioner] nor his client can afford to have him do a really
good job."); Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff'sAttorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUm. L. REV. 669, 711 (1986) (sole practitioner "can deliberately bring a large number of actions and devote relatively little time or
energy to any single case"); Garth, supra note 54, at 662 (Code permits lawyers
to be somewhat less thorough when dealing with small claim).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:697

management. 96 The question of how our system should respond to such teamwork problems must wait until more complex litigation teams are examined.

B. SMALL PARTNERSHIP TEAM
1.

Illustration

Client Hospital regularly sends its medical malpractice defense work to lawyers FF and DD, who have been partners for
twenty years in a ten-partner, small town firm. Psychological
opposites, FF is a careful, deliberate, precise master of detail,
while DD is impulsive, argumentative, and impatient with detail but quick to grasp main ideas. Despite their differences, FF
and DD together handle the firm's large professional malpractice suits. Despite DD's love for argument, his dislike for precision and his inability to perceive nuances of character make
him a poor litigator. FF, punctilious in every detail, therefore
performs the trial work while DD handles motion practice and
appellate work.
Maintaining contacts with the client insurance companies,
FF makes an initial file review of all new cases, contacts parties
if necessary, and enlists help from his associate, A, for detailed
document study. If he feels that they should direct motions to
the complaint, he discusses the motions briefly with DD who,
without reviewing the file, passes it on to Associate A for drafting. Associate A addresses his questions to FF, not DD, before
drafting the motions, which DD then edits and ultimately argues. Over the course of the litigation, A works closely with FF
on pretrial discovery and with DD on drafting motions and appellate briefs. Occasionally DD files motions that strike FF as
unnecessary, contentious, and hypertechnical, but FF never
questions DD's decision to file such motions.
Indeed, the partners work primarily without discussion.
Although they address critical developments that arise, such
discussions are always low-key and brief. The associate is never
included in these meetings but learns of case management decisions through file notes, correspondence, or discussion with an
individual partner. When DD gives A instructions that potentially conflict with positions FF has taken, A will approach FF,
96. See Garth, supra note 54, at 670-71 (ordinary client unable to bargain
for particular level of service because client lacks information and bargaining
power); Kritzer, supra note 12, at 413-14 (individual clients have relatively little leverage because payment is often controlled by others).
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who usually defers to DD's changes, if possible, without comment or criticism.
Respected in the legal community, the partners adhere to
high standards of ethical behavior. They occasionally discuss
ethical dilemmas faced by other lawyers but appear to face no
unresolved ethical dilemmas themselves. 97 The associate understands that he too must adhere to the highest standards of
ethical behavior. 98
While investigating a hospital malpractice suit, A begins to
suspect that the client's laboratory technicians have erroneously misidentified the hospital technician who ran a test that
is the subject of the suit. If A is right, the hospital may lose the
case because the suspected technician is poorly trained and susceptible to using inadequate procedures. A must choose between calling the employees' attention to their mistake by
questioning them further, voicing his concerns to FF, or saying
nothing. He decides to question the employees and learns,
much to everyone's dismay, that the less skilled employee gave
the test. After establishing that the employee used improper
standards, FF advises the hospital to settle the suit and assures
A that he acted correctly. A, however, is less convinced.
2. Discussion: Small Partnership Team
Every team consists of individuals with their own decisionmaking styles, and this team is no exception. Certain crucial
characteristics of this team's operation are unique, yet the
team's structure provides a pattern that may be generalized to
other firm teams as well.
This team differs from the ad hoc team in that it is a longterm team within an institutional structure. This long-term
group superstructure has an important impact on the way that
these partners approach a particular case. Lawyers who work
together can offer clients a broader range of services and larger
staff, making their firm more attractive to clients with greater
97. Their only obvious ethical concern is that they not take on cases that
involve a conflict of interest. See G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 83 ("Involvement in a really serious conflict of interest is feared by a large law firm more
than anything except encountering personal dishonesty in its membership.").
98. Commentators suggest that the need for an unsullied ethical reputation increases with the permanency, and perhaps with the size, of the lawyer
group. See M. GREEN, supra note 1, at 39-40; G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 82;
Nelson, supra note 2, at 124.
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economic resources and more substantial legal work.99 Thus inhouse teams can strike a different balance of efficiency on an

individual case, investing more energy and resources than a
plaintiff's ad hoc team might. 00 Paradoxically, grouping also
strengthens professional identity, increasing individual lawyers'
resistance to client pressure. Thus, firm practice both increases
the potential for pressure from strong clients and the capacity
to resist it. 0 1
Like a long-lasting marriage, this team has evolved over a
twenty-year period. Starting with the raw materials of each
other's personal style and preconceptions, both partners have
come to know each other well in a variety of circumstances. 0 2
Although initial collaborations were informal and unsystematic, the partners gradually developed a system whereby activities could be coordinated with as little friction as possible.
They have come to resemble each other in certain shared values and approaches and, more importantly, to understand thoroughly each other's language and limits despite dramatically
different personal styles. They can infer behavior patterns
from words or gestures and have learned to compromise when
03
they know that they will never agree.'
99. The court in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978), noted:
If [the firm's] size and multi-city status had any effect, it was in the
direction of encouraging the oil companies to divulge confidential information. Whereas they might show reluctance to entrust their substantial assets and future fortunes to a sole practitioner or small law
firm, [the firm's] substance and reputation would tend to comfort any
apprehensions and open the lines of communication.
Id. at 1321; see also Laumann & Heinz, supra note 2, at 233-34 (large firm may
offer broader range of expertise to handle corporate client's diverse needs).
100. Class action suits may produce the same kind of incentive for an ad
hoc plaintiffs' lawyer team to invest massive amounts of time and energy. See
infra notes 120-72 and accompanying text.
101. See J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 58 (examining relationship between
size of lawyer firm, type of client base, and rate of ethical violations); K.
STRONG & A. CLARK, LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT 35 (1974) (sole practitioners
more pressured by client's needs than partners); Schwartz, supra note 8, at
1284-86 (large firms promote ethical conformity yet face strong client
pressures).
102. See Nimetz, Questions Regarding Growth, Participation& PublicRelations in Law Firms, 29 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 451, 451 (1974) (partners in
small firms have close relationships with each other and with associates; this is
less true with large law firms).
103. Cf. W. GORDON & R. HOwE, TEAM DYNAMICS IN DEVELOPING ORGANIZATIONS 123 (1977) (business managers who spend time together make better
decisions than those who do not, because their strong bonds permit them to
tolerate more divergence of opinion).
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Because they work in close proximity, the partners can
make more subtle divisions of labor than can ad hoc associates.
They retain concurrent access to the files and divide responsibility in terms of skills and taste. Organizational teamwork,
however, also requires more subtle balancing to ensure that the
lawyers work together effectively over the long run. This balance produces ethical problems that generally differ from those
of the small ad hoc team. The danger is not that the lawyers
will ignore their client, but that closeness and mutual dependence among team lawyers, and between lawyer and client, will
lead team members to forget the competing demands of their
independent duty as officers of the court. 10 4 The risk arises out
of the very closeness that makes such teamwork successful.
a.

Conflict Management: The Partners

Economics and geography prevented members of the ad
hoc referral team from looking over each other's shoulders.
They were forced to rely on each other's work product completely. On the other hand, these partners work closely together and have the resources needed carefully to plan and
discuss the case. Yet very little discussion actually took place,
and what did occur was casual, elliptical, and never included all
three lawyers.
Two factors explain this silence. .The first is efficiency: too
much information flow interferes with effective team operation. Despite the ambiguity of litigation management and the
need for contextual information, lawyers need not know everything about the case; their clients will not pay for such redundancy. 0 5 Thus these lawyers, like those on the ad hoc team,
must delegate responsibility, trusting that each will make appropriate decisions and pass on any necessary information.
Learning exactly what information should be given to another
lawyer, and what is unnecessary, is one of the more challenging
aspects of teamwork. The ability to determine when one law104. See D. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 12, at 23-24 (stratification of bar
and emphasis on client loyalty weaken commitment to broader values of
profession).
105. Some clients are willing to pay. See J. STEwART, supra note 78, at 66
(client instructing firm to "leave no stone unturned" no matter what the cost).
More often, clients want to control costs, but because of the complex nature of
the lawyering task, they have difficulty knowing whether the lawyers' work is
necessary or not. Cf. Johnson, supra note 30, at 579 (complexity of litigation
and numerous strategic decisions involved makes monitoring of lawyers' work
time consuming and expensive).
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yer should inform another of a development is a skill composed
10 6
of intuition and experience.
To some extent these lawyers' preference for silence may
be as much the result of stress avoidance as efficiency. Infrequent communication is often the most effective means for
managing conflict. Because FF and DD have different personal
styles, they sometimes interpret norms and view case strategy
differently. Being more adversarial, DD is more enthusiastic
about using all litigation tools available. FF, being less combative and more fact- and goal-oriented, likes to dig out facts to
reach the heart of the matter. He always aims for trial.
Their styles both complement each other and pose a risk of
conflict. Because the ambiguous legal and ethical norms support both lawyers' predilections, the lawyers have no external
means for resolving differences. At best such conflicts will
slow them down; at worst they will cause psychological stress,
harm their relationship with the client, or interfere with effective case management. 0 7 Over the years, therefore, these partners have developed methods to control conflicts.
Fundamental, of course, is their mutual knowledge and
trust.'0 8 They use task division to separate their jurisdictions
and rarely interfere with each other's decisions, even if they
disagree.' 0 9 Years of learning what each will and will not do
enables them to turn over authority to their partner without
great risk. Their jurisdictional boundaries do not overlap in
terms of client, witness, or court contact, and communication is
limited to brief, unscheduled, face-to-face contacts. 110
106. See E. SMIGEL, supra note 24, at 260-61 (partners want associate who
can "correctly interpret the not so easily recognizable informal rules.... As
one young lawyer put it: 'Personal success, or lack of it, depends upon your
judgment in keeping a partner up to date on things he is interested in--and to
get off his back.' ") (emphasis in original).
107. Cf. Buckley, Making It in Big-Time Bridge, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1987,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 22, 23 (world championship bridge player, Robert Hamman,
discussing his partner: "We think totally differently about almost everything.
That includes bridge, so we hardly ever discuss it, and we never practice. We
just show up to play.").
108. C. Greenbaum, The Small Group Under the Gun: Uses of Small
Groups in Battle Conditions, 15 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 392, 395 (1979)
(soldiers who fought best were those who maintained strong, supportive ties
with others in groups).
109. Cf. P. DRUCKER, supra note 62, at 547 (members of management team
should not even have opinions in areas not their primary responsibility, and
team members should never fight in public).
110. Cf id. at 548 (because human dynamics are so complex, meetings are
very poor tools for getting work done); R. HALu, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE
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Use of the same associate to coordinate information flow
also contributes to the smooth working of the team. Although
associates often work for only one team partner or several partners on different projects, some, like Associate A, serve as information bridges. The partners coordinate strategy in face-toface meetings and the associate serves as a check in the system
to pick up unnoticed slippage. Although lengthy discussions between partners on the case's progress would be inefficient, it is
relatively inexpensive to use an associate to handle the job.
Perhaps more important, using the associate as a go-between allows the partners to avoid intrusive conflicts.
When each partner has his own associate, this collaborative
system breaks down. Each associate has a primary relationship
with one lawyer and unconsciously adopts that lawyer's style of
addressing problems. When forced to collaborate in, say, preparing a brief, each associate adopts his superior's position, mirroring the partners' differences. Lacking discretion to resolve
or avoid such conflicts, their group work may fail. When only
one associate serves as coordinator, such second-level conflicts
cannot occur.1 11
Given the associate's unusual team position, it is not surprising that he is excluded from the partners' strategy meetings. Although he performs a vital bridging function as
information manager, the partners perceive him as a detail coordinator. Because the associate is not as experienced in the
team's ambiguous operating language, he slows the process
down by requesting more information than the partners exchange to reach a decision. Moreover, A's presence would unmask the partners' game and his role in it. Although his active
participation in strategy meetings might shed new light on unsolved problems, this team follows the pattern of other longrunning teams that limit communication with outsiders who
might increase group pressures. 112
AND PRocEss 169 (2d ed. 1977) (desire of professionals to deal directly with fellow professionals is "exact opposite of organizationally-desired impersonality"); Daft & Macintosh, A Tentative Exploration into the Amount and
Equivocality of Information Processingin OrganizationalWork Units, 26 An-

MIN. Sci. Q. 207, 219 (1981) ("[W]hen tasks are not analyzable, coding schemes
to transmit data and information are hard to develop and use. Communication
is thus less frequent when activities are intangible and ambiguous.").
111. See J. O'SHAuGHNEssy, PATrERNS OF BusINEss ORGANIZATION 33
(1976) (discussing additional complexity created by increasing number of

subordinates).
112. See generally Katz, The Effects of Group Longevity on Project Communication and Performance,27 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 8 (1982) (empirical study of
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Divided labor and controlled communication enable the
partners to avoid most day-to-day stresses of group work. They
will, however, have less discussion about case management and
the conflicting roles and norms encountered than we might expect from two people who work closely on the same project. In
their desire to minimize stress, the partners may choose to ignore signs of unethical or questionable behavior in their colleague unless they believe it will come under public scrutiny.
For example, FF rarely questions DD's decisions to file motions
on fairly flimsy grounds, even though FF would not file such
motions himself, because raising these issues with another partner results in too much stress. Unless he believes that DD's actions will cause public embarrassment, FF looks the other
way.113 Diffusion of responsibility, then, cuts both ways: it
compels partners to care about the clearly unethical behavior of
their teammates if it reflects badly on the firm's reputation but
allows them to sanction behavior that violates their own personal norms.
b. Conflict Management: The Associate's Dilemma
The lawyer-associate relationship is one of the most basic
teamwork units found in law. It is perhaps the simplest unit,
because it is based on familiar employer-employee hierarchical structure. Compared to partnership and ad hoc teams,
lawyer-associate teams maintain clear lines of daily decisionmaking authority but the teamwork relationship makes it more
difficult to discern the legal and ethical contours of the associate's duty to the client and the court. 114 Labor is generally diresearch teams has shown that the longer research teams worked together, the
more isolated they became from information sources that might upset stability
of team).
113. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
114. See Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 259 (1985) (associates owe duty to partners and firm, as well as to clients, legal profession, and society, and duties can conflict); see also In re
Knight, 129 Vt. 428, 281 A.2d 46 (Vt. 1971) (associate under domination of practitioner should have withdrawn when practitioner sought unethical behavior);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1203
(1972) (junior attorney should withdraw from case pending before tribunal
when he forms firm conviction that disclosure of certain information is necessary to prevent fraud on tribunal and supervising attorney disagrees); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmITY 2-110(C)(3) (1980) (lawyer may withdraw from matter not pending before tribunal when inability to work with cocounsel indicates withdrawal will best serve client); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 5.2 (1987) (subordinate lawyer acting at direction of another lawyer responsible for known, clear-cut violations of Rules but not for
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vided on a ministerial-discretionary model.
The associate has his own set of conflicts relating to his expected behavior and the information he gathers. Although all
lawyers face these stresses, they are more pronounced among
associates because of their inexperience and newness to the
profession and to the team. Associates do not yet know themselves as lawyers and hence have no clear sense of what their
own value choices will be when confronted by conflict. Working with these partners serves as an important professional
training ground for A. The partners serve as models in skills
training and in resolution of the complex role demands of a
lawyer. 115 By observing how these lawyers respond to specific
situational demands, A learns how to preserve his sense of honesty and ethicality while presenting the client's case in the best
light. Although no member of the team ever openly discusses
specific ethical questions raised in a case,116 A has gradually
learned to act with more subtlety in areas permitting
discretion.
Because the partners themselves resolve these complex
questions in a highly ambiguous manner, it is unsurprising that
they convey this information to A through collaboration rather
than discussion. The partners explicitly affirm the profession's
written rules but can only communicate the rules' complex application through example. For instance, in answering interrogatories, the associate has learned to control the amount of
information gathered or revealed, thereby internalizing his
respected superiors' method of resolving the tensions created
by their competing duties to the court and the client. Because
he identifies strongly with FF's approach to lawyering, FF's
ethical choices profoundly affect him. In fact, although he does
not feel that DD crosses the line into unethical behavior, he
feels uncomfortable with DD's pretrial tactics, which sometimes raise what A considers to be spurious arguments.
carrying out supervisory lawyer's "reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty").
115. See generally E. SMIGEL, supra note 24, at 147 (through interaction
with partners, associates learn "both the law and how to get along").
116. For one of the rare discussions of the ability of lawyers to address difficult ethical questions with their peers, see Hazard, Comment on "The Special
Responsibility of Lawyers in the Executive Branch," 55 CHI. B. REc. 4, 13, 1718 (1973) (asserting desirability of discussion of conjoint responsibility "even if
embarrassing and difficult because it is self-revealing"). The author states that
"[i]n my experience it's extremely difficult to get attorneys to discuss such issues, except on a one-to-one basis. Make the forum any bigger than one-to-one
and it all becomes a lot of baloney." Id. at 18.
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The problem that A encounters in gathering information
from the laboratory technicians illustrates the team's subtle influence on his behavior. Although vaguely aware of the ethical
dimensions inherent in the question of what to ask the hospital
employees, A feels that he must consider what DD and FF
would do because he relies on their example and does not want
117
to let his employers down.
Ironically, A cannot ask what he truly wants to knowwhat FF would like him to do. He knows that FF would tell
him to find out who conducted the test, but he is unsure
whether FF would tell him to do so because it is the ethical
thing to do, because FF wants full disclosure of all the facts, or
because he has put FF on the spot. Once A and FF openly acknowledge the possibility that facts may be hidden, A believes
FF would have difficulty turning away from further investigation.11 A realizes that suppressing his suspicions might help
the team. 119 Although he does not bury the information, he
feels that he has let the team down and is uncertain that he did
the right thing.
3.

Summary: Small Partnership Team

Like the ad hoc team, this is a small team with a simple
structure. Because the lawyers work closely together, they develop a more subtle division of authority and a more effective
method of transmitting information than the ad hoc team.
Equally important, their client is willing to pay for close collaboration, an advantage unavailable to the ad hoc team.
Despite this closeness, the lawyers operate with as little
overlap as possible. Working within a tight group, the lawyers
must find ways to avoid the conflicts arising from looking over
one another's shoulders. Significantly, their major buttress
against such stress is silence-quenching voices within themselves and discouraging transmission of negative information
from others. Having worked together for a long time, these
lawyers feel that they can comfortably predict how each other
117. Cf. Rhode, supra note 12, at 635-36 (organizational settings encourage
team players, and in certain practice contexts incentives can be particularly
acute).
118. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
119. Cf. Hazard, supra note 52, at 1527, 1532 (lawyers rarely acknowledge
that they may not want to gather all relevant information concerning client's
matter; when two lawyers are involved, discrepancy between adversarial and
truth-seeking roles may be reduced when first lawyer to deal with client
manipulates client's information before case is sent to specialist).
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will handle most situations that arise. Although the team
members and client may view this as a good balance between
autonomy and collaboration, the legal profession must question
whether this balance should be left undisturbed.
C. LARGE An Hoc TEAM
1. Illustration
A Vietnam veteran has asked G to represent him concerning injuries caused by exposure to Agent Orange during his service in the Vietnam war. 2 0 The client wants medical assistance
and also hopes to inform other veterans about the dangers of
Agent Orange. G files suit on his client's behalf against several
manufacturers of Agent Orange. Believing that a larger suit
would be more effective, however, G and a Vietnam veterans'
organization enlist the aid of Y, a lawyer with experience in
toxic tort litigation. Y agrees to turn the case into a billion dollar class action suit on behalf of veterans exposed to Agent Orange' 21 and convinces several other personal injury lawyers to
help him finance and prosecute the suit.122 Because other lawyers are filing similar cases across the country, Y's lawyer
group is initially concerned that they may lose control of the
class action.n2 Members of the group fly around the country
encouraging veterans to hire local counsel who will work with
the team by filing class actions locally.2 4
The lawyers meet on several occasions to discuss management of the lawsuit. They form a consortium of twelve lawyers,125 make some initial funding arrangements,12 6 agree to a
120. This description is drawn from Professor Peter Schuck's detailed
study of the Agent Orange product liability case. See P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DLsAsTERs IN THE COURTS (1986) [hereinafter P.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL]; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (attorney's fee award), rev'd, 818 F.2d
216 (2d Cir. 1987); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (approving settlement); Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling
Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1986)

[hereinafter Schuck, The Role of Judges].
121. P. ScHUcK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120, at 45. The initial strategy included a comprehensive campaign involving a national class action, legislative lobbying, and media saturation. Y was "legal field
commander" of the operation. Id. at 44.
122. Id. at 44-47.
123. Id. at 51.
124. Id. at 47. All parties joined the request that the Agent Orange actions

be consolidated into one case in New York. Id. at 48-49.
125. Id. at 51.
126. Id. at 52. Each lawyer agreed to advance an initial $2000 and addi-
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fee-sharing formula, and divide responsibility for research, document preparation, and discovery. They fail, however, to answer many financial and case management questions.'m
Economic concerns hound the consortium. The lawyers
cannot fund the massive discovery and pretrial preparation
without more capital. Furthermore, no team member has experience managing complex litigation of this size.' 2s The legal
and factual issues are extremely complex, the issue of causation
in particular will be extremely difficult to prove, and defendants have several immunity defenses1-2 9 Not surprisingly, given
the case's complexity, team members disagree sharply about
various case management questions, including the best financing methods and best case strategies. Y wants to undertake a
complex epidemiological study to establish causation, but his
partners refuse to advance funds. 30 When Y threatens to inform the judge of the team's disagreements as a way to force
cohesion and maintain control, 13 ' the lawyers attempt to temper their disputes, but bitterness grows.' 32
The strongest resentment is directed at Y, who is seen as
running the team without regard for the others' views. 33 According to his partners, Y has singlehandedly taken over the
complex issue of causation, 34 refuses to communicate with
them about his strategy L3 5 and will not produce his data, even
when needed for settlement negotiations. 36 Other team lawyers claim that Y will not go over the case with them step by
tional amounts needed to reimburse expenses that the firm deemed necessary.

Id.
127. They did not agree on the scope of the team's work, such as whether
individual causation and damage questions would be handled by local counsel
or by the consortium; nor did they agree on the extent to which expenses
would be reimbursed. P. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120,
at 52-53.
128. Id. at 52, 95.
129. Id. at 52-55.
130. Id. at 52-53.
131. Id. at 53-54.
132. Id. at 64, 73-74.
133. Id. at 53, 63, 73, 84, 104-05. In 1981 some consortium members hired a
management consultant to examine case financing and administration. Id. at
73. The consultant found the consortium's plans for financing the suit nonexistent and described the case as an "accident waiting to happen." Id. He identified Y's poor management as the biggest problem faced by the consortium.
Id.
134. Id. at 103.
135. Id. at 105.
136. Id. at 88-89. Some consortium members claim that Y was separately
negotiating with one defendant. Id. at 90.
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Y rejoins that they have refused to invest the time nec-

essary to learn about causation from him. 38 Y's approach is so
proprietary that, on the eve of trial, Y refuses to tell other team
members the names of the expert witnesses supporting plaintiff's causation theory.

39

Challenged by other lawyer groups 40 and increasingly unable to manage the suit without more funding and expertise, 1 1
team members vote to remove Y as their spokesperson and to
recruit new investors. 142 Although many of the original team
members continue to participate in the suit, the new investors
take increasing control over the case, restructuring143 the feesharing arrangement to raise the percentage of profits available
to the new investors and to lower it for those already involved
in the suit.1' The arrangement also gives new investors approximately the same recovery whether suit settles or goes to
trial, thereby increasing the investors' incentive to settle the
case.
At first, settlement negotiations fail, but on the eve of trial
the federal trial judge informs both sides to "bring their toothbrushes" to the courthouse for settlement negotiations 45 After
two days of negotiations, a settlement agreement is forged. 46
Some members of the class are pleased with the $180 million
settlement fund. Many others believe that the fund is too small
and feel deprived of their day in court. When the court considers the lawyers' fee petitions, it awards the plaintiffs' lawyers
five percent of the settlement amount.' 4 7 The renegotiated feesharing agreement, however, is struck down on appeal. 48
137. P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRAL, supra note 120, at 105.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 104.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 94-95, 105-06.
Id. at 108-09, 120-21.
Id.; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 217-

20 (2d Cir. 1987) (describing fee arrangements).
145. P. SCHUCm, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120, at 150.
146. Id. at 164-66.
147. Id. at 200.
148. Several lawyers challenged the agreement on the ground that it violated DR 5-103 which prohibits attorneys from acquiring a proprietary interest
in an action in which they are involved and DR 2-107, which prohibits division
of a fee with an attorney who is not a member of the same firm unless such
division is made pursuant to client consent and is based upon services performed and responsibility assumed. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrITY DR 5-103 (1980); id. DR 2-107. The trial judge disagreed, reasoning that
because the litigation required the Plaintiff's Management Committee to per-
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2. Discussion: Large Ad Hoc Team
The first two litigation teams handled cases that, like most
American cases, involved relatively simple issues and low-tomoderate stakes. 149 The Agent Orange team and the firm team
depicted in the next hypothetical illustrate the other end of the
spectrum: the teamwork that occurs in the sprawling, complex
cases now dominating the litigation landscape in a manner out
of proportion to their incidence. 150
The large lawyer teams that handle complex litigation differ in several ways from smaller teams. A large team demands
an express organizational structure: implicit division of control
in small teams must be made overt with a large team. Large
teams of lawyers are needed not only to specialize, but also to
provide the "surge capacity" necessary to handle extended,
complicated litigation.151 Unlike small-team lawyers, many
lawyers must work on the same tasks at the same time, from
discovery, through negotiations, to trial. Such same-task work
requires more cooperation and creates a more difficult division
of responsibility than teamwork on cases requiring less
manpower.
Information control and coordinatign are major problems
for large teams. The various mechanisms for control and coordination available to the small team-few members, daily contacts, past experience, division by task or by stage--are by
form like an "ad hoc law firm," it could split fees among its members. In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). On
appeal the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the agreement did not
protect class interests. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at
224 (fee arrangement provided managing attorneys with incentive to accept
settlement offer not in best interests of clients).
149. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 61, 64 ("litigation explosion" is concept
invented by elites with limited view of legal system and propagated in elite
law reviews); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, supra note 93, at
82-84 (in typical case amount at stake is $10,000 or less and case is procedurally
simple).
150. See Galanter, supra note 11, at 46 (as law becomes more complex, it
can be deployed only by actors who can play on the requisite scale); Resnik,
supra note 87, at 511 (as statistical rarities, "Big Case" and structural reform
lawsuit are nevertheless in our imagination because we are drawn to "vivid"
information).
151. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 78, at 295. Marc Galanter has assessed the strengths and weaknesses of such "megalawyer" teams. He argues
that working in larger groups amplifies the power of competent players, allowing them to pursue long-range litigation strategy in a way that individuals
cannot, coordinating their efforts on several fronts, selecting their targets and
forums, and managing the sequence, scope, and pace of litigation. Galanter,
supra note 24, at 172-73.
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definition unavailable as the case grows larger. As more people
make decisions, no one mind can collect, retain, or coordinate
the complex interactions taking place. More complex
frameworks are needed to maximize coordination of team
152
efforts.
Most complex lawyer teams solve the problem by imposing
an internal hierarchical structure on the team and by emphasizing organizational identity. Because huge amounts of material must be gathered and digested, teamwork is mandatory.
Conceding this reality, the lawyers on this team adopted the hierarchical structure of a business by designating leaders, establishing management committees and subcommittees, and
assigning members to various specialized tasks. 5 3 Furthermore, the group tried to develop a coherent public identity,
publically referring to itself as "Y and Associates." Even the
trial judge recognized the plaintiff's lawyers as an ad hoc law
firm.1'
The size of the suit and lack of resources to prosecute it,
however, made it almost impossible to develop a cohesive team.
Because the possibility of recovery was highly contingent, the
lawyers had difficulty mounting the litigation without an adequate infusion of their own capital. Thus business decisions became central to the institution of the case, and team control
went to some extent to lawyers willing and able to pay for it. 155
Although economics are always implicit in a lawyer's decisions,
156
class actions make this dimension breathtakingly overt.
Economic problems also prevented the lawyers from developing a fully staffed, fully experienced team. Continually wor152. For discussions of the complexity of information processing in large
organizations, see J. GALBRAITH, DESIGNING COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (1973);
Ungson, Braunstein & Hall, ManagerialInformation Processing: A Research
Review, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116 (1981).
153. If they do not set up such a committee, the judge will do it for them.
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND § 20.22 (1985) (lawyers may
coordinate their own activities, but court should institute procedures necessary
for efficiency and economy, including selection of attorney spokespersons); see
also Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHI.L.
REV. 306, 314 n.32 (1986) (appointment of lead counsel or steering committee
in complex case may reduce client's litigation costs but not necessarily those of
individual litigator).
154. See supra note 148.
155. See P. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL supra note 120, at 124 (1986)
(by end of case, authority for settlement and for spending was in hands of fin-

anciers who had not lived with case and did not really know it).
156. See generally Coffee, supra note 95 at 677-90 (examining effect of economic incentives on litigation decisions).
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ried about funding, the lawyers could not lavish the kind of
time and resources on the suit that lawyers with a more economically secure defendant class could afford.157 Nor could
they reduce costs by minimizing attention to the case, as did the
smaller ad hoc team. Their stakes in the case were sufficiently
high and the suit sufficiently complex to require vigorous participation. Furthermore, uncertainty as to the suit's length or
the kind of resources ultimately required forced the team to
grow incrementally, like the small ad hoc team. Thus its structure was very unstable.1 5 8
Client control was as weak here as it was in the case of the
small ad hoc team. Although the scale of the class action suit
was larger and the team represented many plaintiffs rather
than an individual, the clients remained weak economic players
with little control over their lawyers. 159 Because the class lawyers looked to each other for funding and decision making, they
could not conceive of the case as belonging to the class. Thus
many of the lawyers focused on early settlement even though
class members might have been more interested in the public
160
forum that a trial provided.
157. This team is no exception to Professor John Coffee's thesis that economic forces generally compel the plaintiff's lawyers to work in small, unstable structures. See id. at 706-12; Coffee, supra note 80, at 17-69. Although 250
United States firms had more than 80 lawyers, the largest firm regularly representing plaintiffs in class action and derivative suits had 37 lawyers. Id. at
20. Plaintiffs' firms have organization and monitoring problems because their
projects are long term, it is hard to know who is shirking, and the tendency
for plaintiffs' lawyers to depend on their individual reputation as litigators
prevents the development of strong "institutional cement." Id. at 21-22.
158. Schuck, The Role of Judges, supra note 120, at 347 (lawyers on plaintiff's management committee at time of settlement were distant from veterans
and had different personalities, ideologies, and incentives from lawyers on
early team).
159. These clients have no more economic resources to support lawyer activity than the clients in the first illustration. They are not repeat players. See
supra note 85; see also Coffee, Rescuing the PrivateAttorney General Why
the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv.
215, 229-36 (1983) (analyzing consequences following from "the necessarily
weak control that the client can exercise over the attorney in complex class
and derivative actions") [hereinafter Coffee, Private Attorney General]; Coffee, supra note 95, at 677-78 (in class actions and shareholder derivative suits
client has only nominal stake in outcome); Note, Abuse in PlaintiffClass Action Settlements: The Need for a GuardianDuringPretrialSettlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308, 318 (1985) (class representatives lack power to
control attorneys).
160. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text; see also P. SCHUcM,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120, at 50 (1986) (many veterans complained that lawyers focused solely on suit instead of veterans' overall
strategy).
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The lawyers' awareness of the contingency of recovery may
also have interfered with group solidarity. Organizational studies have indicated that groups under stress become very cohesive if anticipating success but may fall apart quickly if they
perceive themselves as failing. 61 Thus, the more uncertain the
lawyers are of the case's progress, the less likely they can avoid
overt conflict and develop a coherent approach to case
management.
Motivational differences also interfered with team cohesiveness. Although all of the lawyers wanted economic recovery for the class, and hence themselves, they had a variety of
conflicting secondary goals. Some wanted the professional renown of managing a successful trial; others sought to publicize
the problems of Agent Orange through a trial; still others
wanted only a quick settlement. 62 In fact, Y claimed that his
partners did not want the causation study because it might
show substantial injuries to veterans and interfere with settlement. 63 If true, it is evidence of information "burial" similar
64
to that faced by the associate in the hospital malpractice suit.
This time, however, the litigators buried the information not to
protect the client's welfare, but to protect the litigator's economic interest.
Although similar conflicts exist on every lawyer team, a
large team without a permanent group structure to give it
shared long-range goals may find it difficult to minimize these
differences. Legal commentators have recognized the stresses
that cripple class actions when class members disagree among
themselves and with their lawyers, 65 but they have paid little
attention to the way that the lawyers who serve them reconcile
166
their own conflicting goals.
161. Van de Vliert, Escalative Intervention in Small-Group CoroZicts, 21 J.
APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 19, 22 (1985) (group expecting to win intergroup conflict

will become more cohesive, while cohesion will disintegrate if group expects to

lose).
162. To Yannacone, the case was as much a vehicle for political organization, veteran consciousness-raising, and public education as it was a
self-contained judicial proceeding, in contrast, many of the others saw
the case as a professional and financial venture, a calculated investment in the prospect of a large settlement and award of counsel fees.
P. SCHUCI, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120, at 73.

163. Id. at 53.
164. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
165. See Garth, Conflict and Dissent in ClassActions: A Suggested Perspective, 77 Nw. U.L. REV.492 (1982); Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
STAN.L. REV. 1183 (1982).
166. See Comment, The Use of Subclasses in ClassAction Suits Under Title
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Lawyer Y's management style created an additional source
of stress for the team. He was not, in the eyes of the lawyers, a
good "team player." They perceived him as unwilling to cooperate, to share information, or to modify his own goals to
achieve team harmony. Many of Y's positions later proved to
be correct, 16 7 but he failed to make his ideas operational for the
team.
Judicial control over class representatives may, as a last
factor, have affected team success. Because courts monitor
class representation and retain the power to remove some or all
of the lawyers on the class team,168 these lawyers had less incentive to maintain their group identity when things began going badly.
Although all of these problems--organizational instability,
uncertainty about suit management or future prospects, goal
and personality conflicts--exist in the smaller groups, they
caused greater conflicts in this team than in the two smaller
teams. Unlike the smaller ad hoc team, these lawyers could not
avoid conflicts by working serially because their task required
active collaboration.
Such collaboration was difficult. Although dependent on
the work of their peers, team lawyers could not easily monitor
each other. Unlike the partnership team, these lawyers had no
shared experiences to help them understand each other, predict
behavior, and avoid stresses. They had no ongoing group structure and no tacit arrangements, like that of an associate and
partner, to provide informal monitoring.169 If one lawyer, like
VII, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 116, 145 (1987) (recognizing potential conflicts between
subclasses in class actions and recommending that judges encourage cooperation and information sharing among counsel for various subclasses); see also In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70-76 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (describing
infighting among counsel for class), aff'd in par rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562
(3d Cir. 1984); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (setting forth guidelines governing awardance of fees in class action
in attempt to prevent "chaos" among plaintiffs' counsel and to "avoid duplication and unnecessary expense").
167. For example, Y correctly perceived that causation was crucial. See P.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL, supra note 120, at 113.

168. Id. at 84-85.
169. Professor Schuck has described this problem as encountered in the
Agent Orange litigation:
[T]he members of the PMC [plaintiff's management committee] had
never worked together before. As personal injury specialists, their
customary work style involved one senior partner on a case surrounded by a few young associates. "The PMC consisted of egocentric, aggresive kingpins who were essentially strangers to one
another," one close observer commented. "They had not developed a
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Y,' 7 0 failed to cooperate, teamwork ground to a halt.
Although this class action involved a marginal case, even
lawyer teams working with very solid cases encounter serious
internal stresses. Lawyers may engage in an equally disruptive
manstruggle for case control, not out of uncertainty as to 7case
1
recovery.
the
of
share
their
increase
to
agement, but
3.

Summary: Large Ad Hoc Team

In one sense the teamwork problems and consequent ethical dilemmas of the small ad hoc team are magnified on this
large team. Because the lawyers' potential recovery is both
high and dependent on the outcome of a very marginal suit,
case management decision making is extremely stressful. Crucial decisions are driven by economics. 172 Lawyers cannot prosecute this suit if they do not form a group that can both
underwrite and manage the case. Because they provide all of
the resources for this joint venture and take all of the risks,
however, they may fight bitterly among themselves to control
the suit, creating problems for their client, their opponents, and
the court. We must once again ask, as with the small ad hoc
and partnership teams, whether the teamwork that evolved
naturally is the most desirable form for managing such suits.

D.

LARGE INHOUSE TEAM

1.

Illustration

An old client of ZB, a Wall Street law firm, asks it to defend two major antitrust suits1 73 The client's inhouse counsel
rapport through years of partnership, and it was often hard for them
to get along."
Id. at 123.
170. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
171. An example of this is the bitter infighting of the FinePaper antitrust
case, in which lawyers engaged in fierce competition to control the makeup of
the plaintiff's management team and in outrageously duplicative behavior. In
re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70-76 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also Coffee, PrivateAttorney Genera4 supra note 159, at 238 & n.91 (plaintiffs' teams
"often run along the line of a WPA work-relief project").
172. Coffee, Private Attorney General,supra note 159, at 262 (problem is
not a few bad apples but "structural dilemma involving a skewed incentive
structure"); see supra note 157.
173. This team description is based on published reports of the handling of
the Berkey v. Kodak case appearing in Kiechel, The Strange Case of Kodak's
Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188, and J. STEwART, supra note 78, at 327-

65; see also Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part,603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); Brazil, supra note 93, at 1326-27 (discussing Berkey case); Kid-
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and ZB plan strategy jointly, including a decision to hire a nationally recognized economist as an expert witness. Desiring
the most thorough representation possible,' 74 inhouse counsel
asks that an aggressive partner head up the case.' 7 5 Agreeing,
the firm establishes a team of six partners led by the head of
the litigation department. The team leader then organizes the
team hierarchically by assigning senior partners, junior partners, and associates to manage three key areas: motion prac176
tice, economic theories, and legal theories.
Communications and cooperation between client and lawyers are good. Because ZB realizes at the time of discovery that
no currently available partner could handle the trial, it seeks
counsel outside the firm, offering a partnership to W in exchange for his agreement to direct the case.177 Although nationally known, W has never before handled a complex
antitrust case.178
W changes the suit's administrative structure, taking over
principal responsibility from other partners in several areas
and assigning them to more limited roles. 179 During the course
of the litigation, several partners complain to the head of the
litigation department that W does not delegate enough responsibility to them or trust their work. 8 0
der, Wall Street and the Powerhouse Firms: Stewart's Partners,1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 938, 941 (same); Wessel, Institutional Responsibility: Professionalism and Ethics, 60 NEB. L. REV. 504, 506-09 (1981) (same); FormerAttorney for Eastman Kodak Sentenced to Prison,Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 18,
col. 3 (same). The illustration presented in this Article, however, is not intended to reflect historical fact (we may never know what actually happened),
but to present a hypothetical worst case scenario of the type of events that
may have occurred within the firm and have occurred in other firms handling
similarly complex cases. See, e.g., Law Firm Faulted by Appeals Court, N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1987, at A27, col. 1 (reporting judge's criticism of elite New
York firm for unethical conduct, including deceit in obtaining documents);
Brill, Death of a Career,Am. Law., Dec. 1986, at 1, col. 1 (describing firm associate who violated securities laws by giving insider information about client's
business to outsider); Galante, Rogers & Wells Will Pay $40 M, Nat'l L.J., Mar.
3, 1986, at 3, col. 1, 50, col. 1 (same); Pollock, Rogers & Wells and the J. David
Fiasco, Am. Law., July-Aug. 1985, at 24, col. 1 (describing firm's failure to recognize and prevent client's illegal conduct); Trustee's Criticism of Lawyers in
O.P.M. Imbroglio, Legal Times, May 2, 1983, at 20, col. 1 (client's fraud could
not have occurred without assistance of lawyers).
174. See J. STEWART, supra note 78, at 334.
175. See id. at 330-32.
176. See id. at 335.
177. Id. at 333.
178. Id. at 334.
179. Id. at 335.
180. "An associate who worked closely with [W] during this period de-
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Prior to trial a magistrate orders W to produce all reports
written by defendant's expert about the litigation, including interim reports. 8 1 Although W transmits this order to Stevens,
the ZB partner responsible for this phase of discovery, Stevens
decides that a damaging 1974 letter from the expert does not
come within the scope of the request.8 2 Even after receiving a
second discovery request from plaintiff, Stevens does not reveal
the document's existence, telling plaintiff's lawyers that he will
get back to them. 8 3 The opposition makes no further document requests, and Stevens takes no further action. 184 W is left
85
unaware of Stevens' failure to turn over the letter.
During the expert's deposition, Stevens tells opposing
counsel that documents previously mailed to him by the expert 8 6 have been destroyed. 8 7 An associate, knowing the documents' true location, 8 8 reminds Stevens in a whisper that the
documents have not been destroyed, 8 9 but Stevens ignores him
and subsequently files an affidavit affirming the documents' destruction. 9 0 The associate does not discuss these events with
any other partner but moves the documents to a locked closet
and advises Stevens of what he has done. The two never discuss the incident again.19 ' Stevens later reports to W that he
destroyed some documents sought by the other side. Although
such destruction would be highly unusual during the course of
92
litigation, W does not probe into the matter.
Preparing the expert the night before he is to testify at
trial,' 9 Miller, another partner on the team who has worked
on a different aspect of the case, recalls the expert's earlier,
equivocal letter that Stevens has hidden. Miller reminds the
expert of the letter and its contents. The expert then tells a ZB
scribes him as 'a very good lawyer who could do the work of three. But give
him thirty lawyers--and still he only produces the work of three. He didn't
trust, didn't rely on us. It made me furious."' Id. at 338.

181. Id. at 340; see Kiechel, supra note 173, at 190.
182. See J. STEWART, supra note 78, at 340-41; Kiechel, supra note 173, at

190.
183. Kiechel, supra note 173, at 188, 190.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. J. STEWART, supra note 78, at 341.
187. Id. at 356.
188. Id. at 341.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.; Kiechel, supra note 173, at 190.
See J. STEWART, supra note 78, at 344.
See id. at 356.
Id. at 342-43.
See id. at 345.
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associate of the letter's existence. Although charged with reviewing the expert's testimony with him, she did not previously
know about the letter. 94 She takes the information to W, who
decides that ZB does not have an obligation to produce the letter. 9 5 Because the expert is now aware of the letter, however,
information of its existence comes out on cross-examination
with disastrous results to the client. 196 The jury is convinced
that the client is hiding key evidence, and the trial judge is
19 7
shocked that the ZB team failed to disclose the letter.
After this debacle Stevens confesses to W that he lied to
the court about the suitcase of documents. He admits that the
documents were not destroyed as he had said. Without consulting other firm members, W makes a full disclosure to opposing
counsel and the court. 198 A jury verdict is returned in favor of
the plaintiff. Stevens is expelled from the partnership, and F's
career with the firm is also cut short.199
2. Discussion: Large Inhouse Team
a. Structure
This team stands in sharp contrast to the previous class action team in its ability to capitalize on a hierarchical structure
and group identity to provide the cohesion necessary to handle
complex litigation. Yet significantly, the carefully crafted team
structure cannot forestall serious breakdowns.
Because the client and its lawyers have greater resources,
large firm teams can develop complex, differentiated management structures. 20 0 Coordination is conducted at the top, with
lawyer teams working on various issues. At each succeedingly
lower rung of the hierarchy, work becomes more routine and
task-specific, so that most associates see only a small piece of
the puzzle. 201 Communications move up and down the chain
through informal encounters and written documents. The team
194. See J. STEWART, supra note 78, at 346.
195. See id. at 346-47.
196. Id. at 347.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 349-51.
199. Id. at 357, 363; see also FormerAttorney for EastmanKodak Sentenced
to Prison, supra note 173, at 18, col. 3 (partner sentenced to one month in

prison for lying and withholding documents).
200. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 78, at 295 (bulk of outside corporation work is litigation handled by elite law firms).
201. See E. SIGEL, supra note 24, at 148. Some firms have a rule limiting
teams to four lawyers to avoid this fragmentation. M. GREEN, supra note 1, at
40-41.
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coordinates detailed information through a centralized computer storage system. Informal cross-team exchanges also occur as lawyers talk, often at meals, with their colleagues on
other issue teams. 20 2

Yet task ambiguity still prevents large law teams from obtaining the clear-cut structure and lines of authority of a bureaucratic organization. 20 3 To prevent information overload,
lower level professionals must reduce the amount of information reported to superiors. Yet most legal decisions are themselves based on an ambiguity that requires relaying complex
messages. The problem grows exponentially with team size.
Because task ambiguity makes it difficult to codify this information, 2°4 a communications system for transmitting case data
in a complex team is probably less effective than the creation of
an experienced team whose members share the same values,
know each other well, and trust one another to make similar
decisions under the same set of circumstances. To achieve this,
the complex litigation team must mesh hierarchical control
with group identity so that every team member can draw on
the same type of group understanding that members of small
202. See generally J. STEWART, supra note 78 (describing litigation management in some of the nation's largest law firms). Stewart's description of the
organization of IBM's litigation team gives insight into team structure. See id.
at 53-113. Generally litigation teams in large law firms consist of a senior partner, one or more junior partners, and several associates. When a litigation
project is big, teams are divided into subteams, each working on a separate issue. See id. at 90. The associates generally work alone, reporting to their supervising partners. See id. Some associates work for several partners on
different projects. Their work involves a certain amount of discretion. Most
deal with the documentary evidence in the case, preparing material for use by
partners examining witnesses at trial or deciding what to include in findings of
facts to be presented to the judge. See id. at 83, 90, 96. Associates are sometimes free to contact employees of the client corporation if they need additional factual information. See id. at 74.
Team members learn about the rest of the case by reading documents and
trial briefs and often by talking with other firm members of equal status.
Such conversations frequently occur at meals and at weekly lunches where
lawyers deliver progress reports and participate in a sport together to build
team spirit. See id. at 74. The firm uses a sophisticated computer system to
centralize information processing. Despite the voluminous documentary evidence in the case and a trial transcript of one hundred thousand pages, supervising partners are generally able to remain familiar with the relevant aspects
of the case. See id. at 75; interview with Linda Smitty, Yale Law School (Apr.
11, 1982).
203. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 118.
204. Cf. Middleton, Getting Support, Nat'l L.J., June 4, 1984, at 1, col. 3, 26,
col. 4 (use of paralegals to do routine document work worries trial lawyers
who fear it distances them too much from materials they need to be familiar
with).
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partnership teams use to coordinate their efforts.20 5
Sociologists and other observers have examined the complex methods by which large law firms achieve cooperation on
an organizational level, but they have generally ignored its relationship to specific work groups.20 6 Although inhouse counsel
and government agencies may accommodate professionalism
and bureaucratization differently, 20 7 large law firms derive
much of their strength from socialization.
If strong firm and professional identity are crucial to the
large law firm's effectiveness, internal task sharing engenders
and demands such heightened identity. Long-term training and
observation of associates before selection for partnership is key
to the socialization of the lawyers in a large law firm.20 8 As in
small firm teams, associates learn complex responses to ambiguous tasks and strengthen their allegiance to supervising attorneys through work sharing.20 9 They perceive themselves and
their supervisors as part of a larger group effort, which heightens their identity with the firm and their sense of distance
from the client.
Although both large and small teams stress competent delivery of service as their highest goal, this value is embodied
differently in large firm teams. Standardized norms of competence (and other behavior) are more important in a team with a
large or extremely fluid membership than on the small team in
which members who know each other well accommodate individual idiosyncracies. Similar backgrounds and training, and
the development of unspoken social norms within the firm, increase the group's effectiveness in dealing with task
210
ambiguities.
205. See E.

SMIGEL,

supra note 24, at 249-91; see also Morrison, Making

Partner Tradition in lux, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 12, 1982, at 1, col. 3, 29, col. 1 (associate describing partnership choices reports that "[tihe most important thing
is to be just like them").
206. See authorities cited supra notes 2 and 24; see also M. LIPSKEY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIvIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (analyzing place of individuals, including lawyers, within organiza-

tional structure of public service agencies).
207. See E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 70-174 (examining work of corporate staff counsel, civil service attorneys, and legal service advocates).
208. See E. SMIGEL, supra note 24, at 80.
209. See id. at 299. Smigel quotes one associate as saying that "[m]y first
responsibility is to the partner and then to the client." Id.
210. As one observer noted, "Covington & Burling is a culture as well as a
law firm, as much a community of tribal customs, hierarchical relationships
and extended loyalties as the Trobriand Islanders [or] the Tasadays .... ." M.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 31.
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b. Breakdowns
As in any complex human organization, however, breakdowns concerning information control and prescribed team behavior occur in large lawyer teams. 211 Just as lawyers' tasks
and the information they process are frequently ambiguous, the
impact of a breakdown is also ambiguous. Unlike other professions, ambiguity within a lawyer team, litigation or otherwise,2 2 can sometimes benefit rather than hurt the client. This
tension results from the lawyer's dual role as client advocate
and officer of the court. Because certain kinds of information
or adherence to prescribed ethical norms can hurt the client's
immediate interests, lawyers sometimes adopt methods, consciously or unconsciously, to screen out information before it
reaches them or to3 rationalize the choices they make in their
21
client's interests.
211. Just as important as the breakdowns that occur when the team functions poorly are the ethical problems created by the team when it works well.
Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention to the social problems created
by the powerful smoothly running megateam. The very structure of the team
creates ethical problems, because the team has resources capable of overwhelming both the opposition and the court system. See Control Data Corp. v.
Washington Metro. Area Transp. Auth., 87 F.R.D. 377, 379 (D.D.C. 1980) (expressing dismay at "extraordinary commitment of the resources of the parties,
the talents of counsel, and the time of the Court to what is ultimately only a
dispute about money"); see also Chayes & Chayes, supra note 78, at 296-97
(large-firm litigants have devoted energy and intelligence of elite lawyers to
increasing size, complexity, duration, and cost of lawsuit instead of working on
new ventures and ongoing corporate planning and decision making); Levy,
Discovery-Use and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17 FORuM 465, 470 (1981) (largefirm discovery lawyer who only sees small part of case frequently commits
overdiscovery because he lacks direction, is not sure how trial lawyer will try
case, and does not want to be criticized); Resnik, supranote 87, at 524 (because
judges depend more on attorneys to simplify and clarify issues, the problem of
attorney misbehavior grows as cases become more complex).
212. For an example of a breakdown in a nonlitigation area, see In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %82,124, at 81,988-89 (July 2, 1979) (securities
reporting); see also Pollock, supra note 173, at 24, col. 1 (describing firm's failure to recognize and stop client's illegal Ponzi scheme); Lempert, O.P.M. Lawyers: Could, Should They Have Known?, Legal Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 3
(describing attorneys' service of client for three months after discovering client's serious financial wrongdoing); Lempert, O.P.M. Tale Raises Troublesome
Ethics Questions, Legal Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at 28, col. 1 (same).
213. See Schanberg, Westway Deceit (2), N.Y. Times, June 29, 1982, at A23,
col. 1 (information detrimental to client's interests deliberately withheld from
federal tribunal); see also In re North Am. Acceptance Corp., 513 F. Supp. 608,
614-15 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiff alleged law firm aided and abetted defendants
in violating federal securites laws); SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F.
Supp. 682, 687 (D.D.C. 1978) (SEC alleged attorney aided client in violating
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As the example illustrates, teamwork complicates this conflict. In handling discovery Stevens made several decisions concerning the opposition's requests for the expert's documents.
First, relying on linguistic ambiguity, he decided that the 1974
214
letter did not meet the definition of the material requested,
and when that ambiguity was cleared up upon the second request, he performed his own ambiguous act-he stalled. In effect, Stevens created "lost" information that was known only to
a few team members and was protected from exposure to opposing counsel and the rest of the lawyer team by his inactivity.
Because the expert had also forgotten the letter's contents and
had subsequently developed more favorable views toward the
client's position,2 1 5 the letter might have remained "lost" with
no ill effects to the client for the remainder of the trial. The
team operations had, at least temporarily, created a situation in
which defendant's chief litigator and chief expert witness could
candidly say in court that no prior negative reports existed. If
the action was discovered, the entire firm and its client would
suffer, but if not, diffused responsibility created a screen protecting the upper-level public actors from the impact of their
216
subordinate's decision.
federal securities laws); cf. Rhode, supra note 12, at 598-99 (adversarial framework has often generated ethos in which truth becomes more obstacle than
objective); Hazard, supra note 52, at 1523 (concealing and distorting facts so
client avoids just deserts under the law is "an aspect of law practice that every
lawyer knows about, but many may fear to question"). In a national survey of
1500 large-firm litigators, half of those responding believed that unfair and inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial was a "regular or frequent" problem. Rhode, supra note 12, at 598-99 (citing S. Pepke, Standards of
Legal Negotiations, Interim Report and Preliminary Findings (1983) (unpublished manuscript)); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 639-40 (American
lawyers regard evidence known to them as "private and proprietary" that
must be revealed only if other side makes "specific triggering request"); Brazil,
supra note 93, at 1311-12 (because disclosing relevant but damaging information exposes lawyer to malpractice, discipline, and marketplace sanctions, no
economic or competitive incentives exist to pursue truth); Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers from Their Professions: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 5 J.
LEGAL PROF. 31, 40-41 (1980) (noting traditional view that lawyer's duty to client requires guarding of some information and presentation of evidence in
most favorable light); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,
52 U. CHI. L. REv 823, 823 (1985) (discussing incentives to distort evidence in
our lawyer-dominated system).
214. Cf. Brazil, supra note 93, at 1324 (discussing silent assertion of
privilege).
215. Cf. Langbein, supra note 213, at 835 (subtle pressure on experts to
"join the team").
216. See Vaughan, supra note 64, at 1394 (as structures grow larger and
more specialization occurs, opportunity for illegal behavior increases because
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Although usually not resulting in such obviously negative
results, the phenomenon of "losing" information occurs wherever lawyer teams operate. 21 7 It is reflected in thousands of
judgment calls by which the picture of the client's legal affairs
constantly changes.2 18 The phenomenon was present in the
partnership example in which the associate deliberated over
whether to ask his client's employee a question that could damage the client's entire case. 219 Likewise, it was present more recently in the Iran-Contra hearings, 220 when members of
President Reagan's staff described their mission as one of creating "plausible deniability" for the President. 221 These teams,
lawyer and nonlawyer alike, share one trait: because they see
themselves as fighting in an adversarial world, they regard
keeping dangerous information from the enemy to be of prisuperiors lose control over subordinates and organizational behavior becomes
more obscure). Professor Rhode has noted that "[a]ttorneys working on fragmented aspects of a substantial matter may feel little accountability for its ultimate consequences.
In hierarchical organizations the sources of
rationalization multiply, lack of experience, certitude, or formal responsibility
supply ready grounds for suspending judgment." Rhode, supra note 12, at 637.
217. Information loss can be the result of physical destruction of relevant
documents. See, e.g., Control Data Corp. v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,363, at 93,685-86 (D. Minn. 1973) (as part
of settlement agreement, plaintiff destroyed computerized index to discovery
materials that would have been useful to other plaintiffs); see also Renfrew,
supra note 57, at 279 (difficult to detect attorney's deliberate withholding of
information); Granelli, Gibson Dunn Fined in Document Destruction, Nat'l
L.J., May 10, 1982, at 2, col. 3 (two firms and client fined $375,000 for willful
destruction of documents relating to pending antitrust suit).
218. See Langbein, supra note 213, at 845 (adversary domination of factgathering privatizes decisions about how deep to dig); Renfrew, supra note 57,
at 265 (fabrication and suppression of material facts common although lawyers
and judges do not want to admit it); Hazard, supra note 52, at 1523-24 (events
in which facts concealed or distorted "are largely verbal-things said and
pointedly left unsaid; for the work of the lawyer consists essentially of fashioning words and phrases").
219. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
220. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 9, at 285-326 (discussing concealment of information by Reagan administration officials involved in
Iran-Contra affair); TAKING THE STAND: THE TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT
COLONEL OLIVER L. NORTH (1987) [hereinafter TAKING THE STAND].
221. Compare the remarks of Representative Michael Dewine to Secretary
of State George P. Schultz during the Iran-Contra Hearings: "[I]n my opinion,
you let Admiral Poindexter cut you out.... You stated, and it's uncontroverted, . . . you did not want to know the operational details. In my opinion,
you purposely cut yourself off from the facts." N.Y. Times, July 25, 1987, at
A7, cols. 5-6; see infra notes 245, 266 and accompanying text; see also
Weyrauch, Gestapo Informants: Facts and Theory of Undercover Operations,
24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 569 & n.39 (1986) (discussing concept of plausible deniability).
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mary value. They have built a private morality of secrecy that
222
contradicts their public posture as truth-seekers.
As the example illustrates, both superiors and subordinates
in a hierarchically organized team face problems. When team
size makes it impossible to achieve control through informal
means, superiors must find the proper mix between delegating
responsibility and assuming control over subordinates, and between information flow and information reduction. They face
novel ethical pressures in reaching "information optimality":
control over the way that questions and answers are framed to
elicit the optimal amount of information from clients and to
yield the optimal amount to their adversary and the court. 223
Because work must be divided among lawyers, they must rely
on their subordinates and their peers to exercise these judgments without completely knowing what information lies beyond the unasked question. Yet to discuss these judgments or
techniques openly is to put the group's fragile claim of ethical
probity at risk and to create a sense of group complicity that
224
many lawyers wish to avoid.
Subordinates on large teams also face competing pressures.
Professor Erwin Smigel notes that the ability to interpret and
codify these difficult, unstated rules is the most highly valued
quality an associate can possess.2 25 Subordinates must exercise
professional discretion in decision making without bothering
their superiors. At the same time they must transmit all important information and take no action that will endanger the
outcome of the case. Team subordinates may also face pressure
from their superiors to resolve discretionary decisions in prede222. See E. SPANGLER, supra note 6, at 125 (lawyers sometimes define winning as keeping damaging information undiscovered); Brazil, supra note 93, at
1311-12 (legal community defines success as degree to which client is placed in
better position than that warranted by facts); cf. W. REIsMAN, FoLDED LIEs:
BRIBERY, CRusADEs, AND REFORMS 15-36 (1979) (any social process includes
myth system of rights and wrongs and operational code telling operators when
and how wrongs may be done).

223. See Hazard & Rice, supra note 42, at 109 (incentives in massive case
for litigators to use their superior information to subvert judge); Langbein,
supranote 213, at 833 (rare case in which either side wants anyone to give the

whole truth).
224. Even recording a judgment in memorandum form can prove devastating. See Galante, supra note 173, at 3, col. 1, 50, col. 1 (document discovery in
case against firm accused of failing to recognize and stop client's fraud revealed series of admissions, including note written by one lawyer to himself
saying "Ponzi scheme. Love to have the business, but want to sleep at night.").
225. E. SMIGEL, supra note 24, at 260-61.
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termined ways.22 6 Finally, subordinates may feel strong con-

flicting ethical pressures from above. Their superiors may send
double signals, mandating adherence to strict professional
norms while assigning tasks requiring norm-breaking behavior
for success.
In his study of lawyers' ethics, Professor Jerome Carlin
suggested that ethical pressure on subordinates frequently occurs in hierarchically structured firms.227 Those tasks requiring questionable behavior for success are delegated to
subordinates in the hierarchy.22 8 As a member's status improves, he is less pressured to take unethical actions. Carlin
suggested that lawyer teams using a peer structure, rather than
a hierarchical structure, handle ethical problems differently.
Because peers cannot delegate distasteful jobs to subordinates,
they control group behavior through open discussions of ethics
to clarify group opinion on norm-breaking behavior. 22 9 Such
peer groups will adopt an ethical "climate" that deeply affects
the individual lawyer's behavior, as we saw in the small partnership team.2 30 On the other hand, Carlin found that in hierarchical firms, in which more time is spent actually
collaborating than in peer firms, the firm climate is less indicative of members' ethical attitudes than is their hierarchical position, because that position controls their actions.
Carlin also suggests, however, that promotion in the hierar226. This is also true of government agency lawyers. The greatest threats
to their independent judgment may come not from the outside, but from their
own superiors. Proceedings of the Forty-FirstAnnual JudicialConferencefor
the District of Columbia Circuit,89 F.R.D. 169, 255-57 (1980) (remarks of Joan
Bernstein, General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human
Services).
227. J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 96-117.
228. Id. at 117.
229. Id. at 108-09.
230. Carlin's observation of the impact of peer-group discussion is borne
out by recent sociological research, which has identified a "group polarization"
phenomenon. See generally I. JANIS, GRouFrHINK (2d ed. rev. 1983) (demonstrating that small groups working in high stress situations often exhibit
symptoms of "groupthink," maintaining illusion of invulnerability and unanimity, suppressing personal doubts, and developing "mindguards" to prevent
dissident views). According to Irving Janis, "[O]ne of the most incomprehensible characteristics of a cohesive group that is sharing stereotypes and manifesting other symptoms of groupthink is the tenacity with which the members
adhere to erroneous assumptions despite the mounting evidence to challenge
them." Id. at 60-61; see also Myers & Lamm, The PolarizingEffect of Group
Discussion,in CURRENT TRENDS IN PSYCHOLOGY 346 (I. Janis ed. 1977) (group
discussion enhances initially dominant point of view); authorities cited infra
note 272.
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chy is both the cause and result of ethical behavior. If lawyers
cannot communicate easily, they have no control over their colleagues' work, even when sharing responsibility for the same
tasks. Partners, therefore, select as partners only those whose
judgment they trust. In this light the bizarre aspect of this case
is not that Stevens failed to disclose that the documents existed
or that he lied, but that these behaviors had not been detected
23
or socialized away long ago. '

Carlin's study explains the "clean hands" position of supervising lawyers but does not consider the problems of a
subordinate lawyer who, like A, is confronted by a superior's
rule-breaking behavior. Although confronted with a clear case
of unethical behavior, A apparently did not discuss it with
other members of the firm, the bar, or the client. The associate
faced ethical and pragmatic conflicts: his immediate self-interest lay in preserving Stevens's ethical reputation and his own,
because partnership promotion probably depended on Stevens's
sponsorship. 232 Although it must have seemed clear to A that
his duty required him to alert someone in the firm to the lie,2

he may also have felt that, on another level, his duty required
him to ignore his supervisor's lie because this would relieve
others in the firm of ethical responsibility and would be less injurious to the client's interests if never discovered.2 4 Thus the
231. Perhaps the newness of the team leader, W, contributed to the difficulty that the team had in operating smoothly. See E. SPANGLER, supra note 6,
at 43 (describing problems new lawyers face when joining teams).
232. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 888 (partnership election can stimulate competition in way that blunts ethical instincts).
233. In fact, the associate would likely be required to report his superior's
lie under either the Model Code or the Model Rules. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSiBiuY

DR 1-103(A)

(1980)

(lawyer having un-

privileged knowledge of violation or circumvention of any Disciplinary Rule
shall report such knowledge to tribunal or other authority); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.3(a) (1987) (lawyer with knowledge that another lawyer has violated rule of professional conduct that raises substantial
question as to lawyer's honesty, must inform appropriate professional authority); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 667 (lawyer should talk with advisor before deciding whether to "blow whistle" on client); Lynch, The Lawyer
as Informer, 1986 DuKE L.J. 491 (exploring obligation placed on lawyers to inform against other lawyers and suggesting that reasons for society's general
ambivalence toward informing deserve more serious consideration by authors
of ethical codes); supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing ethical obligations of associate acting at direction of another). But cf Levy, The Judge's
Role in the Enforcement of Ethics-Fearand Learning in the Profession, 22
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 105 (1982) (no lawyer ever disciplined for violating
rule requiring reporting of ethical violations).
234. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 881 (relationship with senior part-
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associate's choice--ethical behavior versus silent collusionmay not have been an exercise in self-interest or blind loyalty,
but a painfully "responsible" decision to participate personally
in unethical behavior to protect the interests of the teams to
whom he owed his loyalty-the litigation team, the firm team,
and the client.23 5 He risked discovery and destruction of his
own career, but he may' have made the choice with fuller
awareness of its implications and less cynicism than might first
appear.

23 6

Ironically, Stevens himself confessed the lie about the undestroyed documents to W.2 7 The partnership immediately expelled Stevens, unable to support further damage to their
reputation-a capital asset-by permitting him to stay.23 8 The

firm was compelled to adhere to the official code at this point.
A's involvement in the scandal also apparently cut short his future with the firm. Although individual firm members may
have sympathized with A's plight, his allegiance to Stevens,
rather than to the firm and to the court, could not be condoned
once it was made public.
ners and work environment "leaves associate with very little ethical room to
maneuver").
235. See infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. For an extreme expression of the "team member" ethic, see TAKING THE STAND, supra note 220.
236. Cf. Engineeris Leaving Utah Rocket Plant,N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1986,
at 21, col. 1 (reporting claim of engineer who testified to Congress that he was
punished for opposing launching of space shuttle Challenger).
237. It is also ironic that in the real Berkey case, the lawyer actually caught
in this information gap was John Doar, who acted as Chief Counsel for the
House Judiciary Committee on the Impeachment of Richard Nixon. In that
position Doar devised a plan to prevent leakage of information by his legal
staff by creating a rigidly hierarchical model of lawyer teamwork. B. WooDWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 113-14 (1976). Each lawyer worked
on a very small part of the case; only a few top staff lawyers had a total view
of the picture. Id. Doar's bureaucratic emphasis was sufficiently strong that
he required his staff lawyers to wrap up all loose work each night. The greatest tribute to a man, he told a staffer one day, would be that if he died, someone could come into his office the next day and pick up where he left off. Id.
238. See Cain, The General PracticeLawyer and the Client Towards a Radical Conception, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS
AND OTHERS 126-27 (1983) (lawyer must preserve professional reputation to effectively serve client's need for legitimation); Larson, On the Nostalgic View of
Lawyers'Role: Comment on Kagan and Rosen's "On the Social Significance of
Large Law Firm Practice," 37 STAN. L. REV. 445, 456 (1985) (one main service
large firm sells is legitimation, and unassailable firm reputation is necessary
prerequisite to this service); Rhode, supra note 12, at 627 ("[R]eputation for integrity remains a profitable commodity in many circles.").
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Summary: Large Firm Team

The large law firm team parallels both the ad hoc and
small partnership teams. Like the ad hoc team, this group possesses a fluid membership and diffuses responsibility among a
series of peer-peer and superior-subordinate relationships.
Although jurisdictional boundaries between peers appear
clearly drawn, with partners assuming responsibility for different trial stages and issues, responsibilities often overlapped;
Stevens, Miller, and two associates all dealt with the expert just
before trial but failed to coordinate their efforts, with costly
results.
The large firm team also shares many of the partnership
team's characteristics: the group shares proximity, duration,
identity, and collective responsibility for powerful clients, giving them a strong incentive to invest considerable resources in
their cases and to cultivate an ethical reputation. In most cases
these qualities ensure that the large law firm delivers competent, ethical services to its clients. The ZB example illustrates,
however, how size alone can create offsetting complexities for
which the large task-sharing team must be prepared. To avoid
these problems, the team must encourage information processing and professional responsibility despite team pressures to
collaborate or ignore unethical behavior. Still, the competing
pressures to work efficiently as a team and win in litigation
make some information gaps advantageous to the client and the
team.
III.
A.

THE

REGULATING LAWYER TEAMS

TENSIONS OF TEAMWORK

Shifting notions of justice and the exercise of legal judgment concerning human behavior, social norms, and political
institutions create ambiguity in the lawyering task. This ambiguity exists not just at the level of application but is inherent in
the structure of law and of the lawyer's craft. Every lawyer
must by definition accommodate competing roles as advocate,
239
court officer, and autonomous professional.
This Article illustrates these emerging tensions, some
novel to teamwork and some characteristic of the lawyering
process but exacerbated by team effort. Most obvious is the
conflict between the efficiencies of task division and the cumu239. See G. HAZARD, supra note 2, at 5; Chemerinsky, supra note 213, at 3943; Greenebaum, supra note 35, at 627; Wasserstrom, supra note 35, at 3.
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lative nature of legal decision making which depends on the individual's finely honed sense of all that has transpired. The
problem reflects the broader conflict between the professional's
need for autonomy and authority to make decisions and the
professional's obligation to share collective responsibility with
other team members. He must be concerned about their actions, perceptions, and ethical choices, yet he cannot intrude on
their decision making without intensifying work stress and undercutting the efficiencies that teamwork is designed to
provide.
Information processing presents a more subtle problem, because eliciting information from a client or revealing it to
others can interfere with a case's successful outcome. The individual lawyer, deciding which questions to ask or how to frame
a response, is not forced to consciously consider the overall balance being struck. When decision-making authority is vested in
a team, however, each team lawyer must strike a new and different balance with each such decision. Most lawyers are understandably reluctant to discuss openly the advantages of
"lost" information or their techniques for regulating information flow. Yet some sense of how this is to be done, and of the
acceptable limits of such behavior is crucial for successful team
operation. Without observing one another making decisions
over a long period of time, then, team lawyers do not establish
a unified approach to information management. Absent such
shared experience, team members may be reluctant to discuss
difficult situations with each other. Instead, they must decide
individually, sometimes with limited information, when and
how far to press their client.24°
Teamwork also heightens the conflict between a lawyer's
duty to an individual client and to the team, particularly in litigation in which adversarial pressures increase the members'
needs for mutual trust and support. 241 As team members, lawyers must allocate their time among cases differently than they
would as sole practitioners. The result may be a more efficient,
competent representation, or, as in the small ad hoc team, abdication of responsibility to other lawyers.
As the lawyer's task grows more complicated and reasons
for teamwork more compelling, the tensions that arise within
240. See Hazard, supra note 116 at 13, 17-18 (conjoint responsibility must be
discussed despite reluctance of agency and firm lawyers to confront issue).

241. Cf. Greenbaum, supra note 108, at 395 (best soldiers those who maintained strong, supportive ties with others in group).
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lawyer teams command our increased attention. We have paid
little attention to how professionals resolve the tensions of
working together on unstructured tasks.24 As the illustrations
suggest, conversations concerning communication and responsibility rarely occur, at least in small teams, because the
problems themselves present too many technical or ethical am43
biguities for the group to directly resolve.2
To this extent the theory that lawyers do not really work
together is borne out in fact. Team members spend as little
time as possible actually delineating their respective duties or
communicating about their part of the team product. This observation parallels the findings of organizational theorists who
point out that when tasks are ill-structured and ambiguous,
team communications are also limited and fuzzy.2 " Rather
242. Because a central precept of professionalism is autonomy in decision
making, bridging the work gap between team members is problematic for all
professionals. Students of the medical professions have discovered that physicians practicing on teams rarely attempt to challenge or control each others'
behavior directly, even if they sharply disagree with the professional's decisions. Instead they create jurisdictional boundaries, by specialization, patient
relationship, or rank, and generally avoid entering another physician's sphere
of authority. When they can avoid conflict by separating themselves temporally or spatially from other physicians treating the same patient, the stresses
of these jurisdictional apportionments are minimized. If they must work at the
same time with the same patient and bear joint responsibility for the result, as
they must on hospital surgical teams, stresses are intensified and often unbearable. See C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REmEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAiLURE
(1979); E. FREiDSON, supra note 6; M. MiLmAN, THE UNKINDEST Cu. LIE IN
THE BACKROOMS OF MEDICINE (1978); Coser, Authority and Decision-Making
in Hospitals: A ComparativeAnalysis, 23 AM. Soc. REV. 56 (1958); Freedman,
A Prolegomenon to the Allocation of Responsibility in HierarchicalOrganizations: The Hospital Context, 4 LEGAL MED. Q. 35 (1980).
243. Their silence may also come from a more fundamental social reluctance to articulate the normative codes that guide small group behavior. See
Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or "Constitution"of a Small Group, 27 J. Soc. IsSUES 49, 53, 59 (1971) (one fundamental norm of small group is that rules are
not to be articulated; if rule is articulated, either deliberately or accidentally, it
will be discarded).
244. Task ambiguity is identified as a characteristic of work that cannot be
easily rationalized or broken down into a series of routine steps because of uncertainty about cause-effect relationships. See Daft & Macintosh, supra note
110, at 208-09; Ungson, Braunstein & Hall, supra note 152, at 122-24. The complexity of the work lies not in its variety or technical difficulty, which may
also be present, but in its "unanalyzability." Daft & Macintosh, supra note
110, at 208-09. When task ambiguity is present, the organization must diffuse
discretion to its members who are specially trained to perform the task. Decentralization, destandardization, and professionalization are key characteristics of organizations performing ambiguous tasks. See Schoonhaven, Problems
with Contingency Theory: Testing Assumptions Hidden Within the Language
of Contingency "Theory", 26 ADMIN. SC. Q. 349, 356, 370 (1981). Task perform-
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than directly address group processes, lawyers develop equally
vague divisions of labor, relying on similar training and experiences to build a rapport in which more sophisticated, clearer
lines of authority can evolve. Obviously only long-range teams
can reach such evolution; a new ad hoc team can only muddle
through.
Like the task itself, the impact of teamwork on the legal
profession is ambiguous. On the one hand, teamwork increases
the chance that clients, particularly corporate entities, will obtain competent and efficient services. It also increases each
lawyer's resources and enables lawyers to deal with more complex issues. Because of the ambiguities of the lawyering task,
teamwork provides a crucial training ground for new lawyers.
Finally, teamwork intensifies lawyers' identity with their professional group by exposing them to professional standards and
offering insulation from intense client pressures.
On the other hand, teamwork has disadvantages. It results
in diffusion of information and responsibility that can affect
both the management of individual cases and the individual
lawyer's sense of autonomy and responsibility for the team's
results.
B. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE
The proper regulatory response to the problems of lawyer
ance becomes the personal responsibility of each member because efficiency
requires that uncertainty be resolved when it arises. See J. O'SHAUGHNESSY,
supra note 111, at 58.
Recent studies show that when task ambiguity exists, very little communication occurs in unscheduled, face-to-face encounters and when communication does occur, it is in language that is general, ambiguous, and highly
symbolic. Daft & Macintosh, supra note 110, at 219-22. Daft and Macintosh
explain that:
[I]f a work environment is fuzzy, muddled, and indescribable, then an
accurate representation of that system is also fuzzy, muddled and indescribable. Messages that are ambiguous and have multiple interpretations thus provide information that is consistent with the
construction of an internal representation that captures the messy,
multiple causation aspects of the system.

Id. at 212.
The authors offer two complementary explanations for low communications: when tasks are not analyzable, coding schemes to transmit data and information are hard to develop and use because they would not be congruous
with the work activities. Further, because the broad symbolic language used
conveys richer content to participants experienced in dealing with those symbols, fewer communications are needed. Id. at 219. These highly charged but
fuzzy messages, like constitutional directives, are used by co-workers trained
in their interpretation to derive rules of decision under varying circumstances.
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teams remains in question. To what extent do team dynamics
need correction and team pressures need counterbalance? We
must ask whether the lines of legal and ethical responsibility
among team lawyers are drawn with sufficient clarity and
whether they are consistent with the level of moral responsibility that lawyers actually feel. We must also ask whether
greater communication and information sharing among team
lawyers should be encouraged.
1.

Clarifying Lines of Responsibility
[I]f this whole thing came down to creating political controversy or
embarrassment ... I would be the person who would be dismissed or
reassigned or fired or blamed or fingered or whatever .... I was willing to serve in that capacity. All of that assumed that this was not
going to be a matter of criminal behavior .... That is one of the essences of plausible deniability.
2 5
-Col.

Oliver North, Iran-ContraHearings4

A sole practitioner has legal and ethical responsibility to
the client, the court, the profession, and society. Beyond these
external strictures lies the lawyer's own sense of personal or
moral responsibility.246 These ambiguous and sometimes discordant responsibilities often cause conflict. Working with
other lawyers adds to the equation by introducing two new layers of legal responsibility. The team lawyer becomes legally
and ethically responsible to third parties for teammates' work
and to the team lawyers themselves. Thus individual responsibility in an organizational setting may be very different from
the responsibility assumed by a sole practitioner.2 7 Although
we know that teamwork engenders strong loyalties among
team members, 248 we are only vaguely aware of the legal, ethical, and moral contours of that additional responsibility or its
effect on the lawyer's sense of obligation to the client and
society.
a.

Lawyers' Responsibility for Their Own Acts

Although lawyers are clearly responsible for their own
acts, teamwork adds subtle shades of meaning to the obligation.
Distanced from the effect of their behavior on clients or other
parties, team lawyers may not feel the full implication of their
actions. In this sense teamwork deprives a lawyer of a sense of
245.
246.
247.
248.

N.Y. Times, July 10, 1987, at A8, col. 1.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
Mounts, supra note 6, at 507-09.
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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autonomy and responsibility at the most fundamental level:
"What is everyone's responsibility is, in fact, no one's
responsibility." 24 9
Team norms contribute to this sense of nonresponsibility.
As the illustrations have shown, lawyers learn how to deal with
ambiguous norms on a day-to-day basis and to assimilate group
norms as they work together. Every team lawyer is forced at
some point to choose between actions that the lawyer considers
proper and a path more protective of the team. 250 More alarming than a conflict between team loyalty and lawyer autonomy
is the total lack of struggle between these choices demonstrated
by many lawyers, so completely have they subjugated their
sense of moral responsibility to team norms.251
Working in a subordinate position further dilutes a team
lawyer's sense of responsibility. As autonomous professionals,
lawyers may exercise their own judgment, but as employees,
their options are limited.2 2 If instructed to engage in clearly illegal or unethical behavior, subordinates must refuse;25 3 if ordered to do something legally or ethically ambiguous, they face
While wanting to make independent dea greater dilemma.2
cisions, supervised lawyers cannot ignore that their superior
has interpreted the situation differently. Thus regulators must
clarify the limits of the subordinate's legal and ethical responsibility.255 Equally important, they must consider the social bond
249. Mounts, supra note 6, at 514; see also Vaughan, supra note 64, at 1391
(organizational processes "create an internal moral and intellectual world in
which the individual identifies with the organization and the organization's
goals").
250. Rhode, supra note 12, at 635-36 (organizational settings encourage
team players).
251. See id. at 635-38.
252. See generally Gross, supra note 114, at 260-61 (associate generally subject to partner's control); Mounts, supra note 6, at 530 (subordinate's responsibility ignored historically because no simple solutions to problem); Levinson,
Ethics Inside the Law Firm (Book Review), 36 VAND. L. REV.847, 847 (1983)
(firm and associate must recognize they owe each other fiduciary duty).
253. See supra note 114; see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1074 (1969) (military defense counsel not justified in obeying order
from superior not to investigate issue if counsel deems it necessary to adequate
defense); G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 459-60 (Supp. 1986) (Model
Rule 5.2(a) cautionary).
254. Commentators have pointed to the pressures that lawyers put in such
positions may feel. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 881-83; Gross, supra
note 114, at 297-309; Mounts, supra note 6, at 475.
255. The section of the Model Rules defining the relative responsibilities of
firm lawyers is described by Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes as
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that exists between lawyers on teams-the pull of "team
spirit"-and how the existence of that unarticulated norm modifies the lawyer's perception of responsibility toward those not
on the team.256
b.

Vicarious Responsibility

Lawyers' legal and ethical responsibility for the acts of
teammates is less certain than lawyers' responsibility for their
own acts. Although traditional tort and agency law principles
define some areas of responsibility, such as a lawyer's liability
to a client for partner or employee malpractice,257 many areas
are left in doubt, including criminal and civil liability and ethical responsibility for the acts of teammates.
Judges have rarely defined the contours of such responsibility, in part because the question is simply too difficult, given
the ambiguities in lawyer teamwork. Furthermore, few judges
are willing to embarrass lawyers publicly by criticizing the
work of individual members of the team.25 8 At the same time,
"a major innovation." G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 253, at 451; MODEL
Rules 5.1 to 5.3 (1987). Model Rule 5.2(b)
provides that a subordinate lawyer does not violate the rules of professional
conduct when acting in accordance with a supervisor's "reasonable resolution
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

of an arguable question of professional duty." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 5.2(b) (1987). Although the Rule is to be praised for addressing
the issue at all, it does not solve all problems. In the first place, the model
may be flawed because it does not recognize that in many bureaucratic situations the subordinate lawyer may have a much better feel for the circumstances surrounding a decision than the supervising attorney. See Mounts,
supra note 6, at 530-33; Levinson, supra note 252, at 858. Giving final say in an
ambiguous situation to the supervisor may, therefore, create more problems
for clients and lawyers than it resolves.
Second, because many disagreements will fall into the "reasonably arguable" area, the Rule may discourage associates from confronting their own responsibility for their acts or discourage them from challenging the instructions
of their supervisors. This is particularly so because the associates' careers depend on the employer's good will. See Gross, supra note 114, at 298-99 (associate may be afraid to disagree even with clearly unethical order if unprotected
from discharge). It also leaves subordinates forced to act in ways they may
consider unethical. We need to consider whether the rule is sufficient as it
stands, see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 883 (Model Rules assume, but do not
require, that discussions will occur, leading to better decisions), or whether
other avenues should be explored for encouraging subordinates to raise their
ethical concerns within the group and whether such techniques might do more
to improve the ethical climate of lawyer teams.
256. See supra notes 104-19, 232-36 and accompanying text.
257. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 882-83.
258. See Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (sanctions hurt lawyer's self-esteem and undermine atmosphere of
friendly cooperation needed for civil litigation); Chrein, The Actual Operation
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lawyers rarely press judges to question their relative responsibility as team members unless disciplinary action is involved or
the financial stakes are high. 259
The issue of vicarious and collective responsibility, however, has become increasingly important 260 because of the increase in suits seeking sanctions for violations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 ' actions against lawyers for security
law violations, 262 and suits seeking attorney's fees. 2 63 In all
three situations, judges and other regulators must explore the
roles played by various lawyers in case management and the
of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 13,16 (1985) (judge does not want to
unduly embarrass counsel).
259. See Galante, supra note 173, at 3, col. 1 (firm accused of failing to recognize and stop client's fraud settles case, foreclosing judicial determinations
of relative responsibilities of participating attorneys); Pollock, supra note 173,
at 24, col. 1 (high stakes); Trustee's Criticism of Lawyers in O.P.M. Imbroglio,
supra note 173, at 20, col. 1 (disciplinary action); cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust
Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70-76 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (judge must analyze relative responsibilities of lawyers in determining attorneys fee award in class-action suit),
aff'd in par rev'd in part,751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
260. See cases cited infra notes 261-63. Compare Pollack v. Lytle, 120 Cal.
App. 3d 931, 948, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, 91 (1981) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (by holding that attorney associated to try case acted as agent of and owed duty to original counsel, majority imposes untenable position of divided loyalties on
associated counsel) with Ortiz v. Barrette, 222 Va. 118, 131, 133, 278 S.E.2d 833,
840-41 (1981) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (majority's refusal to hold associated
counsel jointly responsible for legal malpractice ignores independent action
taken by each counsel which creates responsibility and duty to client). See
generally Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, in RESPONSIBnrIY 107-19 (1975)
(discussing distinction between "bound" and "free" agents).
261. See, e.g., Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1131
(5th Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 sanction for filing frivolous claim properly imposed on
attorney who signed pleadings but not against second attorney who did not
sign pleadings); Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684,
687 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Rule 11 sanctions imposed on both individual attorney
and firm on whose behalf attorney signed documents); Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., 108 F.R.D. 96, 102-05 (D.N.J. 1985) (Rule
11 sanctions imposed on general counsel as well as on local counsel that signed
pleadings).
262. See, e.g., In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release
No. 15,982, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %82,124, at 81,988
(1979) (failure to file disclosure documents traced to "a division of authority
among partners in the firm concerning client matters which significantly impaired communications within the firm"); cf. Trustee's Criticism ofLawyers in
O.P.M. Imbroglio,supra note 173, at 20, col. 1 (bankruptcy trustee's discussion
of responsibility of four sets of lawyers serving corporation convicted of defrauding lenders).
263. See, e.g., Donovan v. CSEA Local Union 1000, 784 F.2d 98, 106 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 74 (1986); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
650 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D. Ind. 1986); Dotson v. City of Indianola, 639 F. Supp.
1056, 1057 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
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legal and ethical shortcomings in their individual performances. 264 If we are to build a common law of lawyer team responsibility, lawyers and judges must overcome their reluctance
and pay more attention to the complex issues raised by lawyer
teams. Although the Model Rules establish some guidelines for
lawyers working with teams, 265 if our discussion is to provide
guidance for who must make these critical decisions, we must
look not only to the positive law, but also to the psychological
dynamics that underlie all teamwork.
2.

Increasing Team Communication and Coordination
I made a very deliberate decision not to ask the President so that I
could insulate him from the decision and provide some future
deniability for the President if it ever leaked out.
-Adm. John M Poindexter,
266
Iran-ContraHearings

Lawyer teams limit nonvital communications for reasons of
' '26 7
efficiency, stress avoidance, and "information optimality.
Although team lawyers perceive limited communication as desirable, we must ask whether greater communication, coordination, and information sharing should be encouraged.
Several benefits might accrue from increased communication. Team members could coordinate their efforts to improve
strategic planning. Some lawyers who do not know each other
well avoid extended communication because they are concerned about wasting time, exposing conflicts, and causing unnecessary stress. 26s Yet, because they avoid working together,
they do not carefully map out strategy. Thus, encouragement
of overt collaboration can serve such a team's long-term
interest.
Increased communication among team lawyers may also
foster ethical behavior by producing lawyers who are better
264. See, e.g., Trustee's Criticism of Lawyers in O.P.M. Imbroglio, supra
note 173, at 20, col. 1 (providing detailed analysis of attorney responsibility).
265. Rule 5.1(a) requires that all firm partners make "reasonable efforts"
to enact measures to ensure firm compliance with the rules of professional
conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1(a) (1987). Rule
5.1(b) requires that a supervisory attorney make such efforts for his subordinates. Id. Rule 5.1(b). Rule 5.1(c) further makes a lawyer responsible for another lawyer's ethical violation if the lawyer ordered the conduct, ratified
conduct that he specifically knew of, or failed to take reasonable remedial action to avoid or mitigate harm resulting from the known misconduct of a partner or subordinate. Id. Rule 5.1(c).
266. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at A12, col. 5.
267. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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aware of the impact of their actions. 269 As the hypotheticals illustrate, team lawyers may willingly act or encourage others to
act in ways that they normally would not condone in open discussion. Improved communication would be particularly effective in hierarchically arranged teams in which superiors could
no longer separate themselves from subordinates' questionable
behavior that they previously left uncontrolled or tacitly sanctioned. 70 Open discussion within teams would also give lawyers
an opportunity to address difficult issues without betraying client confidences. Indeed, only within a team could lawyers explore the implications of their actions without violating the
attorney-client privilege.
Greater communication also serves the truth-seeking function of the adversary system. Lawyers who must explain the
context of their decisions must obtain more information from
colleagues and transmit it to other team members and opponents.' 71 Those who share more facts with each other cannot
bury information or rationalize their behavior as easily as those
who communicate little.
Yet greater communication and coordination has serious
disadvantages. One drawback is inefficiency. Lawyers are reluctant to expend their most valuable resource-their time-on
information exchanges that carry no immediate economic benefit. Communication also increases stress. Forced discussion of
case management questions, particularly issues of role or norm
ambiguity, exposes lawyers to potentially unresolvable daily
conflicts.
Furthermore, raising the level of discussions may not in
fact promote more capable or ethical decision making. Some
organizational studies have indicated that small group discussion can lead to less rational and responsible decisions than
those reached by individuals working alone.- 2 Although care269. Cf. Rhode, supra note 12, at 648 ("[A] more ethically rigorous code
might perform a salutary function by sensitizing professionals to the full nor-

mative dimensions of their choices.").
270. Cf. Vaughn, supra note 64, at 1387-91 (discussing how such group organization diffuses knowledge and responsibility, increasing opportunity for

unlawful behavior).
271. Cf. Hawkins v. Fulton County, 96 F.R.D. 416, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(plaintiff's discovery attempts frustrated when each of two lawyers identified
as representing defendant denied responsibility and told plaintiff that the
other was in charge of the case).

272. See, ag., I. JANm, supra note 230, at 60-61 (discussing adherence of

members of small group working in high-stress situation to erroneous assumptions); Myers & Lamm, supra note 230, at 346 (group discussion enhances ini-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:697

ful structuring of discussion
dynamics can minimize this
2 73
"groupthink" phenomenon,
these studies prevent us from
comfortably asserting that group discussion always leads to
more productive and ethical case management.
Regulators then should identify specific areas in which
greater team communication would result in more responsible
lawyering and create incentives for discussion in those areas.274
One such area involves serially or collaboratively managed
cases for clients with few economic resources. Regulation
would assure that a case received attention from an experienced and informed lawyer who bore responsibility for management decisions.2 75 This need for regulatory oversight is
particularly acute with class action lawyer teams.2 7 6
A second area of concern is the ethical climate within some
teams that fosters suppression of information, failure to ask
critical questions, and misinterpretation of answers, thereby
creating an information gap. Although these problems can occur on any team, they clearly plague closely-knit, high stress
litigation teams in which group loyalty has become a significant
value and superiors overtly or implicitly pressure lawyers to
conform to group norms.
Two strategies are available to increase intrateam communication that leads to careful case management for marginal
cases and class actions and responsible production of information that might otherwise be buried: we must use the judicial
system to exert pressure on litigators, and we must foster more
open discussion among all lawyers about the complex realities
of teamwork.
tially dominant point of view); Hoffman, Applying Experimental Research on
Group Problem Solving to Organizations,15 J. APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 375, 375
(1979) (reviewing research indicating groups do not necessarily produce best
decision of which its members are capable); Stasser & Titus, supra note 62, at
1476 (groups do not always pool necessary information because their discussion
is dominated by information that members already hold in common and by information that supports their own preferences); Tjosvold & Field, Effects of
Social Context on Consensus and Majority Vote Decision Making, 26 AcAD.
MGMT. J. 500, 505 (1983) (research shows groups are less successful problem
solvers for judgmental tasks than for "right answer" tasks).
273. See I. JANIS, supra note 230, at 260-76.
274. Cf. Resnik, supra note 87, at 547 (recognizing need to consider context
in determining which subsets of cases require special kinds of rules).
275. Cf. Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 6, at 25 (discussing sequential representation and noting "the absence of a centralized authority to coordinate the
work of the various lawyers").
276. See Coffee, supra note 80, at 50-52, 62; Note, supra note 159, at 314-19.
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a. Pressureon Lawyer Teams: Sanctions and
the ManagerialJudge
Although not originally intended to improve team lawyering,277 the current thrust toward earlier and more vigorous judicial involvement may result in greater coordination and
discussion within lawyer teams. Using a variety of tools, including wide-ranging sanction powers, "managerial judges" are
compelling lawyers to prepare their cases earlier and more
carefully.2 78 The federal courts rely on Rules 11, 16, and 26(g)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to implement this
scheme. Rule 11 requires lawyers to certify that they have inquired into the legal and factual sufficiency of every paper
filed.279 Rule 26(g), counterpart to Rule 11, requires the signer
280
to certify that similar grounds exist for discovery papers.
277.

But see Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New

Rules of Civil Procedure,Nat'l L. J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1 (noting that
Advisory Committee had been concerned that supervising lawyers in large
firms were not reading documents prepared by subordinates before filing).
278. See Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1832 (1986); Elliott, supra note 153, at 310-14; Peckham,
The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guidinga Case from
Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 771 (1981); Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 399-402 (1982); Schuck, The Role of Judges,
supra note 120, at 349-58.
279. Rule 11 provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading, motions, or other paper; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For discussion of the rationale for and implementation of
Rule 11, see Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcemen
Some "Striking"Problems with FederalRule of Civil Procedure11, 61 MINN.
L. REv. 1 (1976); Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing
Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300 (1986); Comment, Sanctions
Unwarrantedby Existing Law, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 609 (1986).
280. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g). For general discussion of discovery rules and
sanctions for discovery abuse, see Sherman & Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245 (1982); Levy, supra
note 211; Refrew, supra note 57; Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery AbuseThe Recent Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Views from
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Rule 16 establishes complex scheduling and planning requirements281 and provides sanctions for attorneys who disobey
282
scheduling or pretrial orders.
Designed to control what was perceived to be a flood of
frivolous or oppressive litigation,283 these changes may also affect the operation of lawyer teams. A judge who participates
vigorously in case development can force lawyers to coordinate
activities and exchange a greater amount of positive and negative information. Rules 11 and 26(g), requiring a lawyer to inquire into the factual and legal bases for a claim before signing
a pleading or discovery paper, place responsibility on the individual lawyer. Aware that they are subject to sanctions if their
investigatory methods are found incomplete, lawyers signing
papers have the incentive to consider carefully the difficult issues of task, role, and norm ambiguity that they might otherwise have ignored. 284 In the large firm case, for example, if
Rule 26(g) had been in effect and vigorously enforced, Stevens
might have discussed the negative expert opinion letter with
his colleagues or superior. The discussion would have turned
on how an outsider would view the situation.2 5 Thus, managethe Bench and Bar, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.671 (1983); Note, The EmergingDeterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1033 (1978); Note, Discovery Abuse Under the FederalRules: Causes and
Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
281. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)-(e); see also Pieras, JudicialEconomy and fficiency Through the Initial Scheduling Conference: The Method, 35 CATH. U.L.
REv. 943, 945-54 (1986) (discussing initial planning conferences pursuant to
Rule 16).
282. FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(f); see also Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 280, at
281 (discussing proposed amendment adding subsection (f)).
283. See sources cited supra notes 279-80; see also Burbank, Sanctions in
the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983); Peckham, A Judicial
Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Managemen Two-Stage Discovery
Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 264-65
(1985); Underwood, CurbingLitigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary
Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and ProposedAmendments
to the Rules of Civil Procedure,56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 625 (1982); Wade, Frivolous Litigation, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433 (1986).
284. Cf. Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Mgmt., 108
F.R.D. 96, 100-102 (D.N.J. 1985) (lawyers created rationalization helping them
agree proposed answer to interrogatory was complete although each realized it
omitted critical information). One commentator contends that attorneys' "tendency to exaggerate both the strengths of their own case and the weaknesses
of their adversaries' case" is a feature of the trial mentality and that the trial
judge helps to counterbalance this tendency by providing lawyers with an informed outsider's view. Schuck, The Role of Judges,supra note 120, at 356.
285. Of course, the penalty that the team suffered was in reality even heavier than a discovery sanction would have been. The point, however, is that now
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rial judging can promote information sharing between lawyers,
discourage groupthink, and make it 6more difficult for a lawyer
28
to ignore unfavorable information.
Aggressive judicial management can also reduce the incentive for waste, conflict, and incompetent representation that
often mar marginal case or class action teamwork. 28 7 Ideally,
consistent application of these rules will force lawyers who
work on a contingency fee basis to focus on issue development
and trial preparation earlier in the case. Lawyers cannot leave
work entirely to inexperienced associates or to trial counsel in
the hope that the case will settle before they need to produce
their proof.
Although pressure from managerial judges may encourage
lawyers to engage in earlier investigation and information sharing to avoid sanctions, it may also have the opposite effect in
some cases. Because the pressure to invest more time and energy in the case also means more expenditures, it can reduce
the economic incentive to take marginal cases at all.288 Thus
the Rules may ultimately operate to prevent cases involving
difficult proof problems from reaching the courts regardless of
their merit. 289
all lawyers face the risk of discovery sanctions, not just the few involved in the
unusual cases in which serious misbehavior happens to come to the attention
of the court.
286. The rules are particularly effective in forcing careful attention to adversarial arguments because this judicial scrutiny will often come at the end of
the suit. Whether a lawyer has won or lost a case, whether a particular piece
of information was instrumental or not, the lawyer's decisions about how to
handle any detail of the case pertinent to the particular document may be
open for subsequent examination. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 278, at 1835 (litigation in America is undermanaged, not overmanaged, and greater judicial familiarity with facts of case is needed, including judicial involvement in
evidence-gathering); Schuck, The Role of Judges,supra note 120, at 359 ("Judicial involvement in settlement may tend to 'perfect' the lawyer-centered bargaining process... by introducing a third party who can correct for certain
'market failures.' ").

287. Cf. Elliott, supra note 153, at 331 (by imposing compensating costs on
lawyers, "managerial judges might, in theory, correct for problems in the
structure of incentives between lawyers and clients that cause lawyers to overprepare (or under-prepare) to the detriment of their clients").
288. Pressure for earlier investigation and information sharing may also
discourage lawyers from engaging in discovery in the cases they do take. See
Resnik, supra note 87, at 547 (local rules requiring lawyers to document efforts to confer with opposing counsel may so increase costs of discovery that
parties dealing with small matters may stop seeking discovery altogether).
289. The best remedy for this problem, as some judges have suggested, is to
differentiate between types of cases, giving lawyers who handle socially useful
public law cases, or perhaps even private cases brought on behalf of individual
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Of equal significance, judges in several recent class action
cases have suggested that team lawyers spent too much time
communicating and sharing information. For example, in In re
ContinentalIllinois Securities Litigation,290 Judge John Grady
blamed the team structure for problems in plaintiff class action
suits:
Generally, attorneys should work independently, without the incessant "conferring" that so often forms a major part of the fee petition

to work indein all but the tiniest cases. Counsel who are not2 9able
1
pendently should not seek to represent the class.

Up to now judges have discouraged "overlawyering" only in situations in which lawyers appeared to be generating unreasonably large fees. 292 Nevertheless, the tension between these
competing judicial concerns-that lawyers spend more time investigating and conferring with each other and that they avoid
raising fees through needless consultation-indicates that regulators must give the problem more attention.
Commentators have noted that managerial judges play a
clients, more leeway when facts are difficult to obtain. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d Cir. 1986) (because citizens will not have information about official action without discovery, using sanctions to bar suits against
government entities will effectively immunize such defendants from suit), cert.
denied sub nom Suffolk County v. Graseck, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y.) (cases brought
against government officials and government agencies should not be discouraged), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
But see Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (firm application
of procedural rules needed when high officials sued because "insubstantial
lawsuits against high public officials 'undermine the effectiveness of
[g]overnment'" (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.35 (1982))).
290. 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
291. Id. at 933; accord,In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 73 &
n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (taking special note of one litigator's objection to committee
structure of numerous plaintiff's attorneys: "Mediocrity needs group shelter,
but as a perceptive commentator observed 'no park contains a shrub erected to
honor the accomplishments of a committee.' "), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part,751
F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
292. Scholars who work closely with the litigation system have also begun
to suggest that limits on information gathering and sharing by lawyers may be
appropriate or useful when they promote efficiency and encourage settlement.
Cf. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciaryor ReshapingAdjudication?, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 394, 399-400 (1986) (magistrate questioning need for exhaustive data for settlement purposes notes experienced
counsel seem able to value individual claims for settlement purposes "with
only modest amounts of information about the plaintiff"); Elliott, supra note
153, at 321 (we must confront fact we cannot afford to decide every case "based
on the fullest possible information," and only real choice is what techniques
we will use to narrow issues); Schuck, The Role of Judges, supra note 120, at
351-53 (discussing how trial judge in Agent Orange case used lawyers' lack of
information about certain aspects of case to encourage settlement).
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radical new role in the administration of justice as they set
new, and sometimes unreviewable, standards for litigation management.2 93 What has remained unnoticed is the equally radical
role that managerial judges will play in professional regulation
as a result of this reform. Because the standard for "reasonable
inquiry" in Rules 11 and 26(g) is not self-defining, federal
judges must draw on their own experience or upon expert witnesses to determine what lawyers should have learned or done
before taking critical legal steps. Because judges have rarely
been called on to decide how teamwork affects the standard for
"reasonable inquiry," existing case law provides little guidance
for lawyers who wonder to what extent they may rely on the
information transmitted by another team lawyer.294 As sanctions cases continue to flood the federal courts, however, judges
will become far more involved with the inner workings of lawyer teams, and in the process they will assume a significant new
role in the regulation of the legal profession.
Practicing lawyers and scholars, as well as judges, must
consider what constitutes "reasonable inquiry." Obviously in
answering the question, they must clarify the fundamental
goal: Is a reasonable lawyer worried primarily about the welfare of the client? the lawyer's own economic situation? the
search for truth? Should a different standard apply to different
lawyers? different clients? different cases? As the hypotheticals show, the type of inquiry to be made will be profoundly
2 95
different, depending on the goals the lawyer serves.
293. See generally Elliott, supra note 153, at 308 (managerial judging began
as means to create incentives to narrow issue for trial but now used to induce
settlements); Resnik, supra note 87, at 539 (members of bar advocating procedural reform today "don't seem to like procedural formality, the centrality of
lawyers, or adjudication very much at all").
294. Also unresolved is whether lawyers who do not sign court papers can
expect to be subject to sanctions under Rules 11 and 25 if they permit other
lawyers to sign papers that they know are unjustified. Compare Calloway v.
Marvel Entertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions on both individual attorney and partnership on whose behalf
attorney signed papers) and Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine
Mgmt., 108 F.R.D. 96 (D.N.J. 1985) (imposing liability on general counsel even
though only local counsel signed pleadings) with Robinson v. National Cash
Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1987) (only signer of pleadings is liable).
295. Another regulatory change would improve lawyer communication and
responsibility: the requirement that lawyers cannot split a fee unless they
share responsibility for a case should be eliminated. Although on the surface
such shared responsibility would seem to promote lawyer participation and
good case management, the sham participation that it fosters may do more
harm than good because it creates a client-process division that may prevent
critical information from reaching the team member who should have it. Be-
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b. IncreasedPublic Discussion
Although judicial case management may counterbalance, to
some extent, the problems created by lawyer teamwork, far
more critical is the need to have practitioners, legal scholars,
and social scientists explore the complex dynamics of lawyer
teams. The legal profession must discuss the phenomenon of
lawyer teamwork in law schools, bar groups, and the press. Because so much of a lawyer's work depends upon its context,
lawyers can only come to grips with team pressures if they
study the situations that they actually encounter and attempt
to understand the complex psychological dynamics involved in
such situations. Law school ethics courses should include critimust
cal analysis of team dynamics. Likewise, practitioners
2 96
talk more openly about their own experiences.
Professor Deborah Rhode has argued for the creation of
more channels of normative dialogue among lawyers, so that
lawyers can freely confront ethical issues without fear of professional risk.297 Establishing such channels of communication

would help counteract the silence of lawyer teams. Discussion
may both help lawyers accept the reality of their role as organizational professionals and counterbalance the pressures of team
affiliation. 298 Although managerial judges may alleviate immecause many commentators already recognize that the "shared responsibility"
rule is more honored in the breach than in the observance, see sources cited
supra note 84, it is time to accept openly a referral fee rule.
296. Lawyers must also draw on the growing body of social science re-

search and organizational theory to help them understand what they are experiencing. Social scientists have long recognized some of the characteristics
that we have identified in these lawyer teams: the tendency to draw fuzzy organizational lines and to communicate in ambiguous ways when the group's
core task involves high task ambiguity; the tendency of groups to bury information; and the groupthink phenomenon. See sources cited supra notes 64,
110, 230, and 244.
297. Professor Rhode states:
Individuals must have ongoing occasions to confront ethical issues, to
test their perceptions openly, and to raise concerns about client or collegial practices without professional risk. For that purpose, far more
is needed than bar association advisory opinions or law firm conflictof-interest committees. Rather, the profession must fashion structures
within and across employing institutions that can encourage collective
support and a sense of responsibility for normative concerns.
Rhode, supra note 12, at 646-47.
298. Id. at 646, 651 ("There may be no uncontrovertible answers, but there
are better and worse ways of thinking about the questions.... Practitioners
must begin to perceive ethical dilemmas not as aberrant, episodic events, but
rather as the inevitable consequences of bureaucratic pressures, adversarial
frameworks, and social inequalities.").

1988]

LAWYER TEAMS

diate team pressures, lawyers must develop for themselves the
inner resources necessary to cope with the stressful, complex,
and demanding role of a team member.
CONCLUSION
As the lawyer's task grows more complicated and the reasons for teamwork more compelling, the tensions that arise
when lawyers cooperate command our attention. The case
studies in this Article explore these emerging tensions, some
novel to teamwork and some characteristic of all lawyering but
exacerbated by team effort. Most problematic is the conflict
between the efficiencies of division of labor and the cumulative
nature of lawyer decision making. Team lawyers are responsible for, and must be aware of, their teammates' actions, yet
they cannot intrude on their teammates' decision making without intensifying work stresses and undercutting the efficiencies
that teamwork is designed to provide.
Teamwork also subtly affects the manner in which the individual lawyer gathers information from the outside world and
transmits it to team members. Although we have begun to recognize the incentives in our system to "lose" unfavorable information, we have not yet examined the effect of this
phenomenon on team lawyers. Teamwork adds an additional
role to the lawyer's duties, which may encourage ethical lawyering, but may also create a barrier between the lawyer and
the world.
The legal community has paid surprisingly little attention
to how lawyers resolve these tensions. As the case studies illustrate, lawyers silently cope with teamwork problems. They
rarely acknowledge the problems or discuss them with colleagues and never bring the problems to outsiders for examination. Nevertheless, the problems have become too visible and
too disruptive to stay hidden.
"Managerial judging" provides one method for counterbalancing the pressures of lawyer teamwork. In a sense managerial judging creates a new team composed of lawyers and judges
who together develop the case as efficiently as possible without
denying justice to the parties. Despite this new role, ad hoc judicial control cannot substitute for input from the legal community. If the strengths and weaknesses of lawyer teams are to be
understood fully, scholars and practitioners must engage in full
and frank discussion about their experiences with task-sharing
teams.

